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Taming Unicorns
MATTHEW WANSLEY*
Until recently, most startups that grew to become valuable businesses chose to
become public companies. In the last decade, the number of unicorns—private,
venture-backed startups valued over one billion dollars—has increased more than
tenfold. Some of these unicorns committed misconduct that they successfully
concealed for years. The difficulty of trading private company securities facilitates
the concealment of misconduct. The opportunity to profit from trading a company’s
securities gives short sellers, analysts, and financial journalists incentives to uncover
and reveal information about misconduct the company commits. Securities
regulation and standard contract provisions restrict the trading of private company
securities, which undermines the deterrence of private company misconduct.
This Article proposes a three-pronged plan to encourage trading in private
company securities, without compromising investor protection. First, reform section
12(g) of the Exchange Act so that companies are no longer forced to go public when
they acquire 2000 accredited investor shareholders. Second, attach a regulatory
most-favored-nation clause to private company securities so that companies may not
grant the right to resell selectively. Third, require that private companies with
tradable securities make limited public disclosures. These reforms would create a
new market for trading unicorn securities and strengthen deterrence of unicorn
misconduct.
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INTRODUCTION
Until the last decade, most startups that grew to become valuable businesses chose
to become public companies. The gold standard of success for a startup was an initial
public offering (IPO).1 Late-stage startups with reported valuations over $1 billion
used to be so rare that the venture capitalist (VC) Aileen Lee called them “unicorns.”2
When she coined the term in 2013, there were only thirty-nine startups claiming
billion-dollar valuations.3 Since then, the trend of companies postponing or forgoing
IPOs has accelerated. By January 2022, the number of unicorns had passed 900.4
Unicorns have developed a reputation for scandal. Some of the most highly valued
unicorns committed misconduct that went undetected for years. Theranos provided
customers with nearly one million blood tests that it later had to void or correct.5

1. Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012);
Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2021).
2. Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-theunicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/C4E2-36VZ].
3. See id.
INSIGHTS,
4. The
Complete
List
of
Unicorn
Companies,
CB
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/MKZ2-EKWS].
5. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 293
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Uber created software that illegally spied on regulators and allowed its drivers to
evade enforcement.6 Juul advertised its nicotine vaping devices to minors, creating a
market that regulators have struggled to suppress.7 In each of these cases, the victims
of the misconduct included third parties, not just investors.
Of course, public companies commit misconduct too. Unicorns have not been
around long enough for empirical research to determine whether they are
systematically more prone to commit misconduct than comparable public
companies.8 But there is empirical research on how public company misconduct is
detected.9 That research makes it clear that the opportunity to profit from information
about a company by trading its securities is critical to exposing misconduct.10 Private
company securities are not widely traded, so private company misconduct is easier
to conceal.
The market for trading public company securities creates a market for information
about public companies.11 Traders can profit from information about a public
company that is relevant to its stock price but not already reflected in the price, which
makes that information valuable.12 The market for information generates incentives
for short sellers to investigate traded companies. Once short sellers uncover negative
information about a company, they short its stock and reveal the information to the
public so they can profit from the ensuing decline.13 The same market for information
also subsidizes the work of analysts and financial journalists. They build reputations
by scrutinizing public company financial statements and conducting their
independent research.

(2018).
6. See MIKE ISAAC, SUPER PUMPED: THE BATTLE FOR UBER 241–46 (2019).
7. See Matt Richtel & Sheila Kaplan, Did Juul Lure Teenagers and Get ‘Customers for
Life’?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/science/juulvaping-teen-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/989J-F33V].
8. There are some plausible theories for why unicorns might be more prone to
misconduct. See Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353, 383–86 (2020)
(arguing that startup culture encourages entrepreneurs to rationalize misconduct).
9. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213 (2010).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 592–609 (1984) (describing the market for information about publicly
traded companies).
12. According to the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the
market prices of publicly traded securities fully reflect all publicly available information. See
id. at 554–56. If the semi-strong form is true, traders would only profit from trading on private
information that they uncovered. If the semi-strong form is false, traders can also profit from
trading on information that is publicly available but not widely distributed, which Gilson and
Kraakman call “semi-public.” Id. at 589.
13. See Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1333, 1345–55 (2020) (providing evidence of “negative informational activism,”
which they define as short seller activist “behavior that seeks to uncover and then
communicate the truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued”).
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Information indicating that a company has committed misconduct will often affect
its stock price.14 This gives short sellers an incentive to uncover and reveal evidence
of corporate misconduct. Likewise, when analysts and financial journalists inspect a
company’s financial statements, they have an incentive to search for misconduct
buried in the data. Together, short sellers, analysts, and financial journalists increase
the chance that corporate misconduct will be revealed and the speed with which it is
revealed. Once misconduct is revealed, regulators and plaintiffs’ lawyers can impose
penalties. When managers expect that misconduct will be revealed and penalized ex
post, they are less likely to commit misconduct ex ante. In this way, the market for
trading public company securities creates the positive social externality of
deterrence.
Consider the electric-truck company Nikola, formerly a unicorn. In June 2020,
Nikola went public through a reverse merger.15 Once Nikola was public, short seller
Nathan Anderson decided to investigate.16 He gathered information from a “former
Nikola business partner and another person close to the company.”17 Anderson issued
a report on Nikola in September, alleging a pattern of corporate misconduct.18 He
showed that a video Nikola had produced with its prototype truck traveling at high
speed was staged: “Nikola had towed the truck to the top of a hill and filmed it rolling
down the hill in neutral . . . .”19 After Anderson released his report, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal prosecutors launched investigations into
whether Nikola misled investors.20 Its stock price lost more than half of its value.21
Nikola might never have been exposed if it had stayed private.
The market for information about private companies is broken because the market
for trading private company securities is anemic. Securities regulation restricts both
the sale and resale of private company stock.22 Private companies usually encumber
their shares with a contractual right of first refusal.23 Private companies can practice
selective liquidity: allowing directors and managers to cash out, while preventing a
robust market from emerging. Therefore, the ability to profit from negative
information about private companies—and the incentive to uncover that
information—is attenuated. Investors, employees, business partners, and outside
experts who have information about private company misconduct have little
incentive to publicize it. Consequently, private company managers are more

14. See id. at 1349–51 (providing evidence that allegations of “major business fraud,”
“accounting fraud,” “ineffective products,” and “fraudulent stock promotion” are “associated
with significant negative returns”).
15. Gregory Zuckerman, How Nikola Stock Got Torched by a Short Seller, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-nikola-stock-got-torched-by-a-short-seller-11600867055
[https://perma.cc/2HUK-PZPQ] (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:17 PM).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infra Section III.B.
23. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy,
57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 597 (2016); Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 44.
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confident that they can successfully conceal misconduct and are less deterred from
committing it.
The primary investors in many private companies are VCs, and they lack strong
incentives to expose misconduct. VCs have asymmetric risk preferences. They invest
their funds in a portfolio of startups and expect that most will generate modest or
negative returns, and only a small number will grow exponentially.24 The outsize
growth of the few successful startups will offset the losses of the balance of the
portfolio. From a VC’s perspective, the difference between a startup that implodes
in scandal and the many startups that fail to develop a product or find a market is
insignificant.
VC investing also has a winner’s curse problem. Startup fundraising resembles an
auction. Startups pitch to many VC firms in each fundraising round, but they only
need to accept funding from one bidder. In public capital markets, if most investors
decide that a company is fraudulent or excessively risky, its stock price will decline.
In VC markets, if most investors decide that a startup is fraudulent or excessively
risky, the startup will raise funds from the contrarian. The VC that wins the auction
may be especially credulous or risk-loving. The VCs that pass on a startup have no
incentive to share their negative assessment with the public because they cannot trade
on it. VCs habitually refuse to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) with
startups.25 But they generally choose not to reveal the socially valuable information
they learn about fraudulent or reckless businesses in order to maintain a founderfriendly reputation.
Why did we create a system that insulates large private companies from the
scrutiny of trading? From the perspective of the securities laws, the restricted
tradability of private company securities is as a feature, not a bug. Securities
regulation gives companies the choice of two regulatory regimes. Public companies
must make periodic disclosures and take on greater liability exposure. In return, they
can raise capital from retail investors. Private companies face few disclosure
requirements and less liability. But they can only raise capital through private
placements with investors who can “fend for themselves”—mostly wealthy
individuals and financial institutions.26 The shares that those investors buy cannot be
easily resold, to make sure that investors do not create a secondary market of retail
investors.27

24. See Chris Dixon, Performance Data and the ‘Babe Ruth’ Effect in Venture Capital,
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 8, 2015), https://a16z.com/2015/06/08/performance-data-andthe-babe-ruth-effect-in-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/6NM4-92WM] (reporting that, for
one limited partner investing in VC funds since 1985, “about ~6% of investments representing
4.5% of dollars invested generated ~60% of the total returns”).
25. Mike Lincoln, Should You Require a Signed NDA from a Potential VC Investor?,
COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/should-you-require-a-signed-nda-from-a-potentialinvestor/ [https://perma.cc/47L3-F3DV] (advising entrepreneurs that “professional investors
nearly always refuse to sign NDAs”).
26. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); see Usha Rodrigues, Securities
Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3418–21 (2013) (recounting the history
of how wealth replaced access to information as a proxy for whether investors could fend for
themselves).
27. See infra Section III.B.
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Security regulation’s narrow focus on investor protection and capital formation—
and neglect of the deterrence value of trading—is becoming more costly now that
venture-backed startups are staying private longer.28 Startups are increasingly able to
raise hundreds of millions or billions of dollars of capital from private markets.29 In
2018, for example, the SEC estimated that companies raised $1.4 trillion from public
capital markets and $2.9 trillion through private placements.30 This influx of private
capital enables startups to build valuable businesses, but also to commit misconduct
at scale. Until recently, the only way that a startup could raise that kind of money
was through an IPO. Startups that went public would allow their shares to be widely
traded. Trading came with the scrutiny of short sellers, analysts, and financial
journalists. The increasing availability of private capital has severed the link between
funding and tradability and the link between the capacity to harm and deterrence.
This Article proposes a solution: Congress and the SEC should create a robust market
for trading private company securities. Carefully designed regulatory interventions
could push companies to let their shares to be traded, while protecting investors and
companies, especially small businesses, that prefer concentrated ownership. The
solution has three prongs.
First, the regulations constraining the secondary trading of private company
securities should be liberalized.31 Congress should reform section 12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), so that it no longer forces
companies to go public if they acquire 2000 record shareholders who are accredited
investors.32 This change would enable private companies to let accredited

28. The academic literature views the role of securities regulation more broadly than the
SEC’s mission statement does. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
372–73 (2013) (arguing that even “purely as a descriptive matter” securities regulation serves
broader goals than investor protection and capital formation); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006)
(footnote omitted) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial
markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy.”).
29. Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 472 (2017) (“[P]rivate placements of corporate capital
(both equity and debt) have rapidly overtaken public offerings, and the gap is only
increasing.”).
30. Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 84 Fed. Reg.
30,460, 30,465 (June 26, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 227, 230, 239, 240, 249,
270, 274, 275) [hereinafter Concept Release].
31. Three scholars have called for liberalizing the secondary trading of private company
securities. See A. C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs
and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1019–21
(2013) (proposing a “private market” for trading private company securities); Jeff Schwartz,
The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 580–92 (2012) (proposing an
“emerging firm market” as part of a “lifecycle” model of secondary market trading); William
K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REV.
639, 661–72 (2009) (proposing a “sophisticated-investors only” market for trading private
company securities). These scholars would make companies’ participation in these markets
voluntary. See infra note 442.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
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investors—those investors with the greatest sophistication and ability to bear risk—
trade their securities.33 Traders could take advantage of the recently enacted section
4(a)(7) of the Securities Act, which permits resales of private company securities
among accredited investors under certain conditions.34
Second, the SEC should attach a regulatory most-favored-nation (MFN) clause to
all securities sold through the safe harbors commonly used for private placements.35
An MFN clause would require that if a company allows any of its securities to be
resold it must allow all of its securities to be resold, as long as the resale is otherwise
legal. A regulatory MFN clause would ban the practice of selective liquidity and
nudge companies to allow their shares to be traded. Private company directors and
managers could no longer cash out their own shares while allowing their companies
to avoid the scrutiny of robust trading.
Third, the SEC should require that all private companies that let their securities
be widely traded make limited public disclosures about their operations and
finances.36 A limited disclosure mandate would protect investors by ensuring they
have basic information about the companies in which they could invest. But it would
be less burdensome than the public company disclosure system. In early 2022, it was
reported that the SEC is considering a new disclosure mandate for large private
companies.37 But it is critical that any new mandate be tied to reforms to the rules
governing secondary trading.

33. For the definition of accredited investor, see infra Section III.B and accompanying
notes.
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(d).
35. For more details on the SEC’s safe harbors, see infra Section III.B.
36. A growing number of scholars have called for enhanced disclosure requirements for
private companies generally or unicorns specifically, but these scholars would not combine
the new disclosure requirements with liberalized securities trading. See Fan, supra note 23, at
609 (proposing that each unicorn should be required to provide to the public an explanation of
key terms in their most recent certificate of incorporation and other basic information about
the company and provide to all stockholders and employees the financial information that they
provide to major investors); Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How
and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J.
151, 208–11 (2013) (proposing that companies with over $35 million in market capitalization
and over 100 beneficial owners should be subject to disclosure regulations unless they restrict
the tradability of their shares or comply with an alternative disclosure regime); Ann M. Lipton,
Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE
J. ON REG. 499, 563 (2020) (footnote omitted) (calling for companies to “be subject to scaled
disclosures depending on size, taking into account gross receipts, number of employees, asset
values, or some combination of the three”); see also Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock
Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 186 (suggesting
that “[p]erhaps” unicorns should be required to “adhere to the same financial disclosure
requirements as public companies”); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 184 (2017) (commending Guttentag’s disclosure proposal for
distinguishing between unicorns, with potentially dispersed share ownership, and large private
companies with concentrated share ownership).
37. Paul Kiernan, SEC Pushes for More Transparency from Private Companies, WALL
ST.
J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-pushes-for-more-transparency-from-privatecompanies-11641752489 [https://perma.cc/22X5-BV45] (Jan. 10, 2022, 6:00 PM).
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The net effect of these reforms—liberalized secondary trading, the MFN clause,
and the limited disclosure mandate—would be to create a market for robust trading
in unicorn stock among accredited investors. Most large private companies would
likely decide to allow their shares to be traded. Short sellers, analysts, and financial
journalists would be attracted to the markets. Their investigations would strengthen
deterrence of unicorn misconduct. The limited disclosure mandate, combined with
the requirement that investors be accredited, would protect investors. Companies that
wish to retain concentrated ownership would be unaffected.
Deterrence has traditionally been understood as a salutary byproduct of securities
regulation, rather than its objective. When large private companies commit
misconduct, the natural response is to increase the penalty for the underlying
misconduct, not to interfere with the tradability of the company’s securities.38 From
this perspective, policymakers should respond to the Theranos scandal by tightening
regulation of blood tests. But stiffer penalties for misconduct only work when
wrongdoers expect to be caught. Trading creates incentives to expose misconduct
faster.
The Article has four Parts. Part I describes the rise of unicorns and examines three
case studies of unicorn misconduct. Part II explains how the tradability of public
company securities deters public company misconduct. Part III argues that the
difficulty of trading private company securities is undermining deterrence of private
company misconduct. Part IV proposes and defends a solution—liberalized
secondary markets for trading private company securities, a regulatory MFN clause
to nudge companies to let their shareholders access those markets, and a limited
disclosure mandate.
I. THE UNICORN PROBLEM
Unicorns are defined by their value and securities regulation’s private-public line.
Under the Exchange Act, a business must comply with public company regulations
if it activates any one of three triggers:
(1) If it lists its securities on a national securities exchange;39
(2) If it makes a registered public offering of its securities;40 or
(3) If it passes the Exchange Act’s section 12(g) threshold (having $10 million in
assets and a class of securities “held of record” by 2000 shareholders or 500
shareholders who are not accredited investors).41

38. Cf. Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(G), 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1560–61 (2015) (“[W]hen we have regulated [large private companies], we
have done so by way of generally applicable laws having to do with environmental laws,
antitrust, labor and employment, duties, and the like. In short, we have regulated these
businesses’ business practices. We have not forced them into the public disclosure regime, nor
do I think we should do so merely because they are large or powerful.”).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b).
40. Id. § 78o(d).
41. Id. § 78l(g). For the definition of accredited investor, see infra Section III.B and
accompanying notes.
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The first two triggers—exchange listings and registered public offerings—are
voluntary acts. The third trigger, section 12(g)’s record shareholder rule, can be
tripped inadvertently, so companies wishing to stay private take care to avoid it.42
The conventional way to go public is through an IPO. Under the Securities Act of
1933 (“Securities Act”), companies planning an IPO must first file a registration
statement with the SEC.43 Once the statement becomes effective, they can raise
capital on the public markets. IPOs have come under criticism as an inefficient
transfer of wealth to bankers and lawyers.44 Companies are increasingly opting for
other paths to the public capital markets, like direct listings45 or merging with specialpurpose acquisition companies.46
Companies go public so they can raise capital more cheaply and provide liquidity
for their shareholders.47 Because the sale and resale of private company securities are
restricted, companies that raise capital from private investors must discount the price
for the illiquidity.48 Private company shareholders are often locked-in to their
investment until the company is acquired or has its IPO.49 For some private company
shareholders, especially founders, that investment can represent a significant fraction
of their net worth.50 Going public enables shareholders to sell their shares and
diversify their investments.51
Complying with public company regulations is costly. Public companies must
periodically disclose, among other things, their financial condition, risk factors,
executive compensation, and related-party transactions.52 They must file an annual
report that includes their audited financial statements, quarterly reports with interim
financial statements, and current reports on the occurrence of specified events.53

42. But see Rodrigues, supra note 38, at 1530 (footnote omitted) (presenting evidence
that “only 2.94% of firms (35 out of 1192) went public with over 400 shareholders” between
2000 and 2012 and concluding that “Section 12(g) probably forced very few firms public”).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (banning the offer or sale of any security until a registration
statement is effective).
44. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 31, at 1013–15 (characterizing IPOs as a transfer of
wealth to “blood-sucking parasites”).
45. See Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is It a Recipe for Gatekeeper Failure?,
72 SMU L. REV. 177, 187–96 (2019) (describing the rationale for, and mechanics of, direct
listings).
46. Ramey Layne, Brenda Lenahan & Sarah Morgan, Update on Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/17/update-on-special-purpose-acquisitioncompanies/ [https://perma.cc/89HL-SU4P] (documenting the rise of special-purpose
acquisition companies).
47. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 409, 432–34 (2008).
48. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 22–23 (explaining that VCs demand an illiquidity
premium on investments in startup equity).
49. See id. at 6–8 (explaining investor lock-in in startup equity).
50. See Sjostrom, supra note 47, at 433 (explaining that a startup founder’s “ownership
stake likely represents a large percentage of [the founder’s] net worth”).
51. See id. (explaining that a sale allows a founder “to have a more diversified portfolio”).
52. See generally Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2020).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (annual report); id. § 249.308a (quarterly
report); id. § 249.308 (current report).
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When a company goes public, the company, its officers, and its directors also become
exposed to greater civil and criminal liability.54
Until recently, venture-backed startups were built for IPOs.55 VC investing used
to follow a predictable pattern. VCs would raise funds from limited partners (LPs),
usually institutional investors.56 Then they would invest the money in a portfolio of
startups in exchange for preferred stock.57 VCs would expect that many startups in
their portfolio would fail, some would be acquired, and a few successful ones would
have an IPO.58 When startups went public, the VCs would sell their shares to public
investors after a lock-up period. The exponential returns from the startups that went
public would offset the losses from other startups in the portfolio.59 The VCs would
then distribute the proceeds to their LPs and keep twenty percent of the profits for
themselves.60 In this way, the IPO market fueled the market for VC investing. But
the pattern has started to change.
A. The Rise of the Unicorns
In the past two decades, IPOs have plummeted. In all but one year between 1991
and 2000, there were at least 100 VC-backed startups that had an IPO.61 By contrast,
since 2001, there have only been two years in which more than 100 VC-backed
startups had an IPO.62 The decline in IPOs is all the more remarkable because the
total assets under management by VCs have steadily risen, from $155 billion in 2004
to $444 billion in 2019.63 Some of the decline in IPOs can be attributed to more
startups exiting by acquisition.64 But many successful startups have decided to forgo
both kinds of exit and to remain private even as they reported valuations over $1
billion.

54. See Sjostrom, supra note 47, at 437–38 (describing the potential civil and criminal
liability of public companies, directors, and officers).
55. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 11; Lemley & McCreary, supra note 1, at 17–18.
56. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2003).
57. See id. at 1071–72.
58. See id. at 1075 (describing IPOs and acquisitions as successful exits and presenting
data indicating that IPOs are rarer).
59. See Dixon, supra note 24.
60. See Gilson, supra note 56, at 1072.
61. JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: VC-BACKED IPO STATISTICS THROUGH
2020 3 (2021), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs-VC-backed.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J4DH-RS6].
62. Id.
63. NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, NVCA 2020 YEARBOOK: PUBLIC DATA PACK 1 (2020),
https://nvca.org/recommends/nvca-2020-yearbook_public-data-pack-2/
[https://perma.cc/9C7P-E8F].
64. See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 1, at 18 (footnote omitted) (“The number of VCbacked firms acquired has jumped from 190 per year in the 1990s to 450 per year recently—
a 140% increase.”).
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According to the VC research firm CB Insights, there are now over 900
unicorns.65 Roughly half are based in the United States.66 Among unicorns that are
still private, the most valuable unicorn is Bytedance, the owner of the short video
app TikTok.67 Unicorns have emerged in a broad range of industries, including
aerospace (SpaceX), cosmetics (Glossier), fintech (Stripe), and media (Vice).68 They
include now familiar gig-economy companies like Instacart and more experimental
technologies—autonomous vehicles (Nuro), plant-based meat (Impossible Foods),
and virtual reality (Magic Leap).69
The valuations that these companies report are potentially misleading. Valuing
public companies is straightforward because their capital structures are
straightforward. Most public companies issue one class of common stock.70 If you
multiply the price of one share of common stock by the total number of shares
outstanding, you get the company’s market capitalization. Valuing venture-backed
startups is more complex because their capital structures are more complex. Startups
generally issue common shares to their founders and employees and different classes
of preferred shares to each new round of VCs.71 Each of these share classes can have
different contractual rights.72 For example, preferred shares almost always carry a
liquidation preference, which entitles the holder to be paid back a certain amount—
usually the amount of its investment—before common shareholders receive any
money in a sale.73 Not all preferred shares are equal. Investors in later rounds of
funding often receive preferred shares that are senior to preferred shares in earlier
rounds.74
The valuations that startups report ignore the differences between share classes.
The standard practice is to multiply the price of one share of the newest class of
preferred shares by the total number of shares outstanding.75 Because this class of

65. The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, supra note 4.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality,
135 J. FIN. ECON. 120, 121 (2020). Some tech companies, like Alphabet and Facebook, have
multi-class structures in which shares with the same cash flow rights do not always have the
same voting rights. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST
(2019),
https://www.cii.org/files/FINAL%20format%20Dual%20Class%20List%209-2719.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNX9-VC7].
71. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 126 (reporting that the most common liquidation preference in their dataset was
a “1x” preference); see also Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture
Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV.
874, 889–901 (2003) (arguing that VCs in the United States use convertible preferred stock
for its tax advantages).
74. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 70 (explaining that “preferred shares that were
issued early [are] frequently junior to preferred shares issued more recently”).
75. See id. (explaining how the venture-backed startup Square arrived at the valuation it
reported to the public in 2014 by multiplying the price per share of its most recently added
class of preferred shares by its total number of shares).
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shares will usually have more valuable cash flow rights than the shares of all other
classes, the reported valuation will usually overstate the startup’s fair market value.76
Calculating a startup’s true fair market value would require accounting for the
contractual rights of each class of the startup’s shares. One recent study attempted
this calculation for 135 ostensible unicorns and found that the average company
reported a valuation that was 48% higher than its fair market value.77 If reported
valuations matched fair market value, 65 of the 135 companies would not qualify as
unicorns.78
There is no consensus on why the number of unicorns is growing so quickly. One
early hypothesis was that the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
dampened enthusiasm for IPOs.79 Certain SOX provisions, including section 404—
which requires management to report annually on the company’s internal controls—
increased the costs of being a public company.80 Empirical evidence for the claim
that SOX caused the decline in IPOs is mixed.81 Another hypothesis is that the
gradual deregulation of private capital markets lessened the appeal of going public.82
Over time, Congress and the SEC have relaxed the rules governing the sale and resale
of private securities and allowed the investor wealth thresholds built into these rules
to erode through inflation.83 This has allowed private companies to raise more capital
at a lower cost without an IPO.
More recently, secondary markets for trading startup shares have emerged.84 As
Part III explains in more detail, these markets are opaque, illiquid, and low volume.85
Companies generally control whether their shareholders can participate. These
markets do not generate robust trading. But they do enable a company’s directors
and managers to sell their shares, which reduces the liquidity pressure that pushed
earlier startups toward an IPO.86

76. See id. at 122 (explaining how Square’s publicly reported valuation overstated its fair
market value).
77. Id. at 134–35.
78. Id. at 135.
79. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 654–58; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 545–46.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
81. See de Fontenay, supra note 29, at 464–65.
82. See id. at 466–72; Jones, supra note 36, at 174–77.
83. See de Fontenay, supra note 29, at 467–70 (pointing to the promulgation of
Regulation D, the expansion of investors eligible for Regulation D, the increasing number of
investors who meet the wealth threshold to be an accredited investor, the 1996 amendments to
the Investment Company Act, the adoption of Rule 144A, and the reduction of Rule 144’s
holding period); Jones, supra note 36, at 174–76 (pointing to the reduction of Rule 144’s
holding period and the JOBS Act’s lifting of Regulation D’s ban on general solicitations for
accredited investors).
84. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 16–20; Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall
Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 193–202 (2012).
85. See infra Section III.C.
86. See Pollman, supra note 84, at 205 (explaining that “secondary markets provide a
‘release valve’” for participants’ liquidity needs); de Fontenay, supra note 29, at 461 (“Going
public is now viewed primarily as a mechanism for founders, employees, and early investors
to cash out their relatively illiquid stakes in the firm.”).
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During the Obama administration, Congress attempted to stanch the decline of
IPOs by passing the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”).87
The JOBS Act created the “IPO On-Ramp,” which relieved “emerging growth
companies” from certain disclosure obligations and other regulations for the first five
years after IPO.88 It also postponed the onset of SOX section 404’s provision
mandating an internal controls report from two years to five years after IPO.89 A true
unicorn may not be an “emerging growth company” for long after it goes public
because the definition excludes companies with a public float (the total value of its
publicly traded shares) of $700 million or more.90
Despite its stated goal of encouraging IPOs, the JOBS Act also made it easier for
growing companies to remain private. In 2010, Facebook briefly considered bundling
capital from multiple investors into a single investment vehicle to avoid section
12(g)’s record shareholder rule.91 Congress responded to this perceived problem by
raising the record shareholder threshold for public company status from 500 to 2000
shareholders, as long as fewer than 500 are unaccredited investors.92 The JOBS Act
did not achieve a sustained increase in venture-backed IPOs.93 Instead,
notwithstanding a relatively hot IPO market in 2020, the number of unicorns
continued to rise.94
B. Unicorn Misconduct
The rise of unicorns has been accompanied by high-profile scandals involving
misconduct—fraud, gross negligence, or other illicit activity. Some of the
misconduct harmed not only the companies’ investors, but also their employees,
consumers, or communities. These unicorn misconduct scandals have taken varied
forms. Theranos’s product, a reliable finger prick blood test, never materialized, but
the company fraudulently claimed it had. Uber provided a real service to its
customers but expanded its business by illegally spying on regulators. Juul took
advantage of regulatory uncertainty to illegally market its addictive product to
minors. In each case, regulators eventually acted and imposed penalties. The

87. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2) (relief from certain Securities Act disclosures); id. §
78m(a) (Exchange Act disclosures).
89. Id. § 7262(b).
90. See id. § 78c(a)(80) (providing that a company is no longer an “emerging growth
company” on “the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated filer’”); 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b–2(2) (2021) (defining “large accelerated filer”).
91. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Facebook and the 500-Person Threshold, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/facebook-andthe-500-person-threshold/ [https://perma.cc/M2D6-9NTU].
92. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 28, at 338; 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(a).
93. This was not immediately obvious, because an anomalously high number of venturebacked startups went public in 2014. See Ritter, supra note 61, at 3. In recent years, the number
of venture-backed IPOs has resembled the numbers from the post-2001, pre-JOBS Act years.
See id.
94. There were 110 VC-backed IPOs in 2020, more than in any year in the last two
decades except 2014. See id. at 3.
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companies lost value after the misconduct was revealed. But the harm done was at
least partially irreversible.
1. Theranos
Elizabeth Holmes dropped out of Stanford to found the company that would
become Theranos in 2003.95 She took an early investment from Tim Draper, the
father of one of her childhood friends and a partner of the blue-chip VC firm Draper
Fisher Jurvetson.96 Theranos repeatedly claimed to have developed a reliable finger
prick alternative to venous blood tests. For example, in 2006, Holmes gave a demo
of an early prototype blood test to Novartis executives and faked the results of the
test to mask that the device had malfunctioned.97 When Theranos’s CFO confronted
Holmes about the fake results and her exaggerations to investors, he was fired.98 In
2008, Theranos’s general counsel and its head of sales and marketing told a Theranos
director that Holmes had misled the board about the company’s finances and the state
of its technology.99 The board met without Holmes and decided to replace her as
CEO.100 But after a two-hour meeting, Holmes convinced the other directors to
change their minds.101
Theranos grew quickly. Walgreens and Safeway both agreed to partnerships in
which Theranos would conduct blood tests in their stores.102 But observers who got
close to Theranos continued to have doubts. Theranos had told Walgreens that its
devices could handle 192 kinds of blood tests.103 A Walgreens employee tasked with
vetting Theranos wrote in a report that the company might be “overselling or
overstating” what its technology could do.104 An anonymous review left on the
workplace review website Glassdoor suggested that Theranos had lied to VCs,
doctors, patients, and regulators.105 Nevertheless, in 2013, Theranos publicly
announced the launch of its first consumer tests in Walgreens stores and got a
favorable write-up in the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal.106 In 2014, the
company reported a valuation of about $9 billion.107
Theranos managed to forestall closer regulatory scrutiny for years by arguing that
its devices were “laboratory-developed tests.”108 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) believed it had the authority to regulate lab-developed tests.109 But the agency

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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had deferred to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which had
its own authority to regulate under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments Act of 1988 (CLIA).110 Theranos employee Tyler Shultz grew
concerned that the company was cheating on CLIA-mandated proficiency testing.111
Theranos was taking the proficiency tests with third-party commercial analyzers,
even though it had started to use its own devices for tests on real patients.112 Shultz
looked up the relevant CLIA provision and found that it required proficiency test
samples to be “analyzed ‘in the same manner’ as patient specimens ‘using the
laboratory’s routine methods.’”113
In March 2014, Shultz confirmed with the New York State Department of Health
that Theranos’s proficiency testing method violated the regulation and filed an
anonymous complaint with state regulators.114 The state forwarded the complaint to
CMS, but it got “lost in the shuffle.”115 Shultz also raised concerns with his
grandfather, former U.S. Secretary of State and Theranos board member George
Shultz. The elder Shultz encouraged his grandson to address the issue with Holmes
directly.116 When he did, Holmes responded angrily, and Shultz resigned.117
Another Theranos employee, Erika Cheung, also blew the whistle on the
company’s regulatory cheating. CMS had outsourced routine CLIA lab inspections
in California to an underfunded state agency.118 In November 2013, a state inspector
visited Theranos’s facility, but Theranos President Sunny Balwani and other
employees misled the inspector so that he never saw the part of the lab that contained
its proprietary devices.119 In September 2015, Cheung sent an email to CMS
describing Theranos’s misconduct and specifically mentioning that Theranos had
misled a state lab inspector in 2013.120 This time, regulators acted quickly,
conducting a surprise inspection of Theranos’s lab three days after receiving the
email.121
Outside experts had suspicions about Theranos too. Some physicians in Arizona
questioned the results their patients had received from Theranos blood tests.122 In
December 2014, Adam Clapper, a pathologist living in Missouri, learned about
Theranos from a profile of Holmes in the New Yorker.123 He wrote a blog post
questioning whether Theranos’s devices could be as accurate as the company

110. Id.
111. Id. at 194.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 493.801(b), (b)(1) (2020)).
114. See id. at 195.
115. Id. at 248.
116. Id. at 195–97.
117. Id. at 196–97.
118. Id. at 113.
119. Id. at 188–89.
120. Id. at 281; see also id. at 189 (explaining that CMS outsourced routine lab inspections
to the state).
121. See id. at 282.
122. See id. at 232–36.
123. Id. at 219.
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claimed.124 In February 2015, Stanford epidemiologist John Ioannidis wrote an
opinion article in the Journal of the American Medical Association raising doubts
about whether Theranos could have achieved such an important innovation without
publishing it in a peer-reviewed journal.125
Yet Theranos did not face any consequences until October 16, 2015, when the
Wall Street Journal reporter John Carreyrou revealed that Theranos had been using
third-party commercial analyzers rather than its own technology for many of its
consumer blood tests.126 Carreyrou had been tipped off by Clapper.127 He uncovered
the fraud by speaking with employee whistleblowers, including Shultz and
Cheung.128
A few days after Carreyrou’s initial article, Bill Maris, the founder of Google’s
VC arm, Google Ventures (GV), told a reporter that GV had passed on investing in
Theranos in 2013.129 According to Maris, GV had sent an employee to take a
Theranos blood test at Walgreens as due diligence on its technology.130 Maris
claimed that when the employee “went to get a test done, Theranos wanted more than
just a drop of blood.”131 When the employee refused a full venous blood draw, he
was asked to come back a week later “to give more blood.”132
In January 2016, CMS sent Theranos a letter stating that its lab was not in
compliance with CLIA and its practices posed a danger to patient health and safety.133
In March 2018, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Theranos,
Holmes, and Balwani.134 Holmes agreed to a settlement in which she paid a $500,000
penalty, relinquished her voting control of Theranos, and was barred for ten years
from serving as an officer or director of a public company.135 In June 2018, Holmes
and Balwani were indicted on fraud and conspiracy charges.136 Later that year,

124. Id. at 220.
125. John P.A. Ioannidis, Stealth Research: Is Biomedical Innovation Happening Outside
the Peer-Reviewed Literature?, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 663, 663 (2015).
126. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-testsWALL ST. J.,
1444881901 [https://perma.cc/LF7Y-BKWW] (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM).
127. CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 222.
128. See id. at 231–32 (conversations between Carreyrou and Shultz); id. at 236–37
(conversation between Carreyrou and Cheung).
129. Jillian D’Onfro, Bill Maris: Here’s Why Google Ventures Didn’t Invest in Theranos,
INSIDER (Oct 20, 2015, 6:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bill-maris-explains-whygv-didnt-invest-in-theranos-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/7KRG-UFAT].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Letter from Karen Fuller, Manager, State Oversight & CLIA Branch, Div. of Surv. &
Certification, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Sunil Dhawan, Dir., Theranos, Inc. 1
(Jan.
25,
2016),
https://cdn2.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/5969923/
Theranos_Inc_Cover_Letter_01-25-2016.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4SL-EFX4].
134. Press Release, SEC, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged
with Massive Fraud (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41
[https://perma.cc/J9QA-PY7C].
135. Id.
136. Indictment at 1, United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-cr-00258-LHK (N.D. Cal. June
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Theranos dissolved.137 In January 2022, a jury found Holmes guilty on some but not
all of the charges.138
2. Uber
Uber was one of the most highly valued startups in VC history.139 But Uber may
never have grown so valuable without its illegal spying software, Greyball.140 The
program started in 2014.141 In June of that year, Uber raised a Series D round and
reported a valuation of $18.2 billion.142 Uber was rapidly expanding, and that July,
Uber had announced that it was entering China.143 But it was encountering increasing
opposition from local regulators in the United States. For example, that fall, the
Philadelphia Parking Authority started an aggressive enforcement campaign against
Uber.144 Its agents would hail rides, fine the drivers, and impound their vehicles.145
The campaign was effective. Drivers in Philadelphia “became too scared to drive for
Uber.”146
Uber developed the Greyball program to fight back against the Philadelphia
Parking Authority.147 Uber’s engineers “came up with about a dozen ways to spot
authorities,” like checking which users opened and closed the app rapidly near police
stations.148 To identify regulators or law enforcement, Uber’s city managers would
“scan other details on new user accounts—personal information like credit cards,

14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/page/file/1135066/download [https://perma.cc/
6AYC-N3YS].
137. John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130
[https://perma.cc/23F6-9ZB5] (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:10 AM).
138. Sara Randazzo, Heather Somerville & Christopher Weaver, The Elizabeth Holmes
Verdict: Theranos Founder Is Guilty on Four of 11 Charges in Fraud Trial, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-elizabeth-holmes-verdict-theranos-founder-is-guilty-onfour-of-11-charges-in-fraud-trial-11641255705 [https://perma.cc/R37S-PWK8] (Jan. 3, 2022,
11:45 PM).
139. Dana Olsen, Uber by the Numbers: A Timeline of the Company's Funding and
Valuation History, PITCHBOOK (Nov. 29, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/uber-bythe-numbers-a-timeline-of-the-companys-funding-and-valuation-history
[https://perma.cc/HG2W-RVC4] (showing that Uber’s private valuation peaked around $68
billion in 2016).
140. For a discussion of how Greyball fit into Uber’s business model of strategic
lawbreaking, see Charles M. Yablon, The Lawyer as Accomplice: Cannabis, Uber, Airbnb,
and the Ethics of Advising “Disruptive” Businesses, 104 MINN. L. REV. 309, 349–56 (2019).
141. See ISAAC, supra note 6, at 244.
142. See Olsen, supra note 139.
143. Carlos Tejada, Uber Launches in Beijing, Will Face Uber-Heavy Traffic Jams, WALL
ST. J., https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/15/with-beijing-launch-uber-to-faceuber-heavy-traffic-jams/ [https://perma.cc/K2AQ-TJWD] (July 15, 2014, 3:53 AM).
144. See ISAAC, supra note 6, at 244.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 245.
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phone numbers, and home addresses—to check whether the data were tied directly
to a police credit union.”149 Once Uber was confident that a user was a police officer
or parking enforcer, Greyball would make it impossible for the user to hail an
Uber.150
Greyball succeeded in allowing Uber to evade regulators. The Philadelphia
Parking Authority never realized they were being spied on, and its campaign to
impound cars failed.151 Greyball rapidly expanded beyond Philadelphia.152 At one
point, Uber held a secret summit of its general managers from “more than a dozen
countries” to share best practices for using Greyball.153 Uber justified the program to
its employees on the ground that regulators trying to enforce local rules were hailing
rides “fraudulently” and therefore “violating Uber’s terms of service agreement.”154
Uber continued to expand. In December 2014, it reported a valuation of $41.2
billion.155 In August 2016, its valuation neared $68 billion.156
Even though its employees around the world knew about Greyball, Uber
successfully concealed it until 2017. In that year, an employee whistleblower
approached a New York Times reporter.157 On March 3, 2017, the New York Times
published its first story on Greyball, which was based on the whistleblower’s
information.158 Within days, Uber instructed employees not to use Greyball.159 In
May 2017, it was reported that federal prosecutors had launched an investigation into
Greyball.160 The combined effect of the Greyball revelations and other scandals
damaged Uber’s reputation. In January 2018, Uber’s valuation had fallen to around
$54 billion, wiping about $14 billion off its earlier valuation in 2016.161 Uber would
later recover and go public in 2019.162

149. Id. at 245–46.
150. Id. at 246.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 26.
153. Id. at 246.
154. Id.
155. See Olsen, supra note 139.
156. See id.
157. ISAAC, supra note 6, at 241–43 (describing Isaac’s interactions with the
whistleblower). The whistleblower sought out Isaac because of his earlier articles on sexual
harassment at Uber. See id. at 241–42.
158. Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evadeauthorities.html [https://perma.cc/R64P-BXBZ].
159. ISAAC, supra note 6, at 247.
160. Mike Isaac, Uber Faces Federal Inquiry over Use of Greyball Tool to Evade
Authorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/
technology/uber-federal-inquiry-software-greyball.html [https://perma.cc/4CUN-QBP9].
161. See Olsen, supra note 139 (explaining how the $54 billion figure was derived).
162. See Mike Isaac, Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, How the Promise of
a $120 Billion Uber I.P.O. Evaporated, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/uber-ipo-price.html
[https://perma.cc/
E7WZ-2EWM].
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3. Juul
JUUL Labs, better known as Juul, is a startup that sells vaping devices that
resemble USB drives.163 A “Juul” mixes nicotine with benzoic acid, which gives
users a burst of nicotine when they inhale.164 When Juuls were introduced to the
market, they contained “as much as three times the concentration of nicotine
contained in most e-cigarettes.”165 Juul’s executives insisted that the company’s
target customers were adult smokers looking to quit cigarettes.166 But it is now clear
that the company was at best indifferent to the risk that its advertising would reach
minors.167
When Juul was considering how to launch its product in 2015, its leadership was
presented with an ad campaign that would compare cigarettes to obsolete
technologies like boomboxes and joysticks.168 But the management team rejected
that idea in favor of a campaign that would feature cool, young models.169 An
anonymous Juul manager who spoke with the New York Times said that “[w]hile the
campaign wasn’t targeted specifically at teenagers, . . . he and others in the company
were well aware it could appeal to them.”170 Juul’s “employees and its board of
directors acknowledged concern that models photographed for the . . . [c]ampaign
appeared to be too young,” but used the images anyway.171 Juul also bought banner
ads on websites frequented by teenagers, including the sites for Nickelodeon,
Cartoon Network, and Seventeen.172
The campaign succeeded in reaching minors. The whistleblower told the New
York Times that “within months of Juul’s 2015 introduction, it became evident that
teenagers were either buying Juuls online or finding others who made the purchases
for them. Some people bought more Juul kits on the company’s website than they
could individually use—sometimes 10 or more devices.”173 He said that when his
colleagues “saw the social media, in fall and winter of 2015, they suspected it was
teens.”174 A study would later find that 44.9% of Juul’s Twitter followers were likely
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen.175 It would also later be revealed that in

163. The Juul was developed in 2015 by a startup called Pax Labs. Richtel & Kaplan, supra
note 7. Juul became independent from Pax Labs in 2017. Complaint at 5, Commonwealth v.
JUUL Labs, No. 2084CV00402 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.mass.gov/doc/juul-complaint/download
[https://perma.cc/SBG7-2U8S]
[hereinafter Mass. Complaint].
164. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7.
165. Mass. Complaint, supra note 163, at 8.
166. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7 (quoting Juul co-founder James Monsees’s statement
that “selling Juuls to youth was ‘antithetical to the company’s mission’”).
167. See id.
168. See Mass. Complaint, supra note 163, at 8–10.
169. See id. at 10–11.
170. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7.
171. Mass. Complaint, supra note 163, at 15.
172. Id. at 17–18.
173. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7.
174. Id.
175. Annice E. Kim, Robert Chew, Michael Wenger, Margaret Cress, Thomas Bukowski,
Matthew Farrelly & Elizabeth Hair, Estimated Ages of JUUL Twitter Followers, 173 J. AM.
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2017, Juul “refused to sign a pledge not to market to teenagers” as part of a civil
settlement.176
Juul’s website purported to verify customers’ ages by asking for their birthday
and the last four digits of their social security number.177 But Juul sent marketing
emails to approximately 40,000 of its website visitors who failed the age verification
process as well as to 269,000 visitors who never completed it.178 An analysis
conducted by a firm retained by Juul concluded that 83% of the email addresses on
the company’s mailing list could not be matched to an adult.179 In at least one case,
Juul’s customer service team allegedly advised a would-be customer who failed the
age verification process to use the address of an adult friend or relative to complete
their order.180
Juul’s marketing worked. In a four-week period in the spring of 2017, Juul’s sales
rose 627%.181 Then, in July 2018, the Washington Post reported on Juul’s practice of
marketing to consumers who failed its age verification process.182 In August 2018,
the New York Times published the whistleblower’s inside account of Juul’s
advertising campaign.183 By then, Juul controlled 72% of the e-cigarette market and
had reported a valuation of $16 billion.184 In December 2018, Altria, the tobacco
company formerly known as Philip Morris, paid nearly $13 billion for 35% of Juul’s
equity.185
Increasing scrutiny eventually caught up to Juul in late 2019. In September of that
year, Juul replaced its CEO with an Altria executive.186 In October, Altria wrote
down its investment in Juul by $4.5 billion, citing the likelihood that the FDA would
take flavored vaping products off the market.187 In November, New York and
California sued Juul over its marketing to young people, and the American Medical

MED. ASS’N PEDIATRICS 690, 691 (2019).
176. Julie Creswell & Sheila Kaplan, How Juul Hooked a Generation on Nicotine, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/23/health/juul-vaping-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/9ASA-94DU] (June 28, 2021).
177. Mass. Complaint, supra note 163, at 36–37.
178. Id. at 30.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 41–42.
181. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7.
182. Deanna Paul, E-Cigarette Maker Juul Targeted Teens with False Claims of Safety,
Lawsuit Says, WASH. POST (July 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2018/07/30/e-cigarette-maker-juul-targeted-teens-with-false-claims-of-safetylawsuit-claims/ [https://perma.cc/883J-UJHP].
183. Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7.
184. Id.
185. Sheila Kaplan & Matt Richtel, Juul Closes Deal with Tobacco Giant Altria, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/health/juul-reaches-deal-withtobacco-giant-altria.html [https://perma.cc/W2NU-7SSA].
186. Sheila Kaplan, Matt Richtel & Julie Creswell, Juul Replaces Its C.E.O. with a
Tobacco Executive, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/health/juulvaping.html [https://perma.cc/C39A-8ES2] (June 28, 2021).
187. Katie Robertson, Juul’s Meltdown Costs Tobacco Giant Altria $4.5 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/business/altria-juul.html [https://perma.cc/
2Q9S-Y9PK] (Nov. 20, 2019).
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Association called for a ban on vaping products.188 In December, Congress enacted
legislation that raised the minimum age for purchasing tobacco products, including
e-cigarettes, from eighteen to twenty-one.189 In January 2020, federal officials
announced a ban on some, but not all, flavorings in vaping products.190 Later that
month, Altria wrote down its investment by another $4.1 billion.191 At the time Altria
bought its stake in 2018, Juul’s implied valuation was $38 billion; that figure fell to
$12 billion in 2020.192 But Juul succeeded in creating a new market for tobacco
companies. By 2019, an estimated 27.5% of U.S. high school students were reporting
recent e-cigarette use.193
4. Commonalities
Theranos, Uber, and Juul each committed misconduct to facilitate exponential
growth. Theranos pushed to get its devices in stores quickly with inflated claims
about the number of blood tests they could reliably handle. Uber used Greyball to
avoid the sluggish and uncertain process of negotiating with local governments as it
entered new markets. Juul’s marketing to minors created a much larger market for
its devices. Each of the companies saw its valuation rise rapidly while it was
committing misconduct and fall after it was exposed.
Another feature that these scandals have in common is the long latency period
between when the misconduct started and when it was revealed. Theranos’s board
was made aware that Holmes had misled them about the state of the company’s
technology in 2008.194 Theranos launched its commercial service in September
2013.195 But the public did not learn that Theranos was committing fraud until

188. Karen Zraick, A.M.A. Urges Ban on Vaping Products as Juul Is Sued by More States,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/health/juul-lawsuit-nycalifornia.html [https://perma.cc/J2GC-G427].
189. Sheila Kaplan, Congress Approves Raising Age to 21 for E-Cigarette and Tobacco
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/health/cigarettesales-age-21.html [https://perma.cc/PWY8-PY47].
190. Abby Goodnough, Maggie Haberman & Sheila Kaplan, With Partial Flavor Ban,
TIMES,
Trump
Splits
the
Difference
on
Vaping,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/health/flavor-ban-e-cigarettes.html
[https://perma.cc/CK5Q-U5YR] (Feb. 12, 2020).
191. Katie Robertson, Altria Takes a $4.1 Billion Hit on Juul Stake, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/business/juul-altria-vaping.html
[https://perma.cc/RJ8R-9JL5].
192. See id. Altria may have paid a premium for its stake in Juul over what public investors
would have paid to have influence over a potential competitor. See Lemley & McCreary, supra
note 1 at 12–26 (describing the recent increase in incumbents acquiring potentially competitive
startups).
193. Karen A. Cullen, Andrea S. Gentzke, Michael D. Sawdey, Joanne T. Chang, Gabriella
M. Anic, Teresa W. Wang, MeLisa R. Creamer, Ahmed Jamal, Bridget K. Ambrose & Brian
A. King, E-Cigarette Use Among Youth in the United States, 2019, 322 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
2095, 2095 (2019).
194. See CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 50.
195. Id. at 174.
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October 2015.196 Uber deployed Greyball between the fall of 2014 and March
2017.197 Juul advertised to minors from 2015 through at least 2017.198 These long
latencies matter because the time allowed the companies to harm more consumers
and communities. In the case of Theranos, the latency enabled the company to
provide nearly one million inaccurate blood tests to consumers.199
The long latencies are even more remarkable because of how many people knew
or suspected that the companies were committing misconduct. Juul’s marketing was,
of course, public. At Uber, managers in more than a dozen countries attended the
summit discussing Greyball.200 At Theranos, the list of people with knowledge or
suspicions includes insiders like the anonymous reviewer on Glassdoor, Tyler Shultz,
Erika Cheung, the company’s former CFO, its former head of sales, its former
general counsel, and all its directors. But it also includes people outside the company,
like Theranos’s business partners at Walgreens, the investors at GV, physicians in
Arizona, and technical experts like Ioannidis and Clapper. It is worth asking whether
some of this information could have reached the public sooner.
II. TRADING AND DETERRENCE
The market for a company’s securities creates a market for information about the
company.201 The price of a company’s stock reflects expectations about its future
profits. Traders stand to gain by acquiring information that is relevant to a company’s
expected profits but not already reflected in its stock price.202 Short sellers who
uncover negative information about a company can trade based on the information,
reveal it publicly, and profit from the ensuing decline. Trading also subsidizes the
work of analysts and financial journalists.203 These intermediaries apply their
specialized skills to help traders process newly revealed information.204 They also
use their reputations or their institutions’ trades as a costly signal to help traders
verify information.205

196. See Carreyrou, supra note 126.
197. See ISAAC, supra note 6, at 244; Isaac, supra note 158.
198. See Richtel & Kaplan, supra note 7 (reporting that Juul’s advertising campaign that
reached minors started in 2015). Juul gradually refocused its advertising away from minors.
See, e.g., id. (“The company said that toward the end of 2016 and around the beginning of
2017, it changed its social marketing campaign and guidelines to require all models to be over
the age of 35.”). But, even in 2017, Juul was refusing to sign a pledge to stop marketing to
minors as part of a civil settlement. Creswell & Kaplan, supra note 176.
199. CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 293.
200. ISAAC, supra note 6, at 246.
201. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 596–609.
202. See id. at 563–64 (“[I]nvestors who lack either hard or soft information may act to
acquire it, rather than waiting passively for the passage of time to reveal it to them.”).
203. See id. at 594 (“Evaluation of information . . . requires special skills, such as a facility
in accounting, finance or securities analysis, that can ordinarily be obtained only through
investment in expensive professional training. The cost of such training is reflected in the
wages of the skilled employee . . . .”).
204. See id. at 607 (explaining how “the services of information intermediaries such as
financial analysts” can help traders economize on information processing costs).
205. See id. at 604–05 (explaining how intermediaries use their reputations or investments
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The information market facilitates the acquisition, revelation, processing, and
verification of information about corporate misconduct. News that a company is
committing misconduct can affect the price of its securities in many ways. It could
increase the chance that the company will incur a regulatory penalty or face costly
litigation. It could undermine confidence in management. It could raise questions
about the underlying value of the company’s products or services. If traders expect
that information about misconduct will have any of these effects, they will value it.
Short sellers will attempt to acquire information about misconduct, and analysts and
financial journalists will attempt to process and verify that information.
The actions of self-interested traders lead to deterrence. Traders undertake
investigative work that may be more costly for regulators. Once traders reveal
information about corporate misconduct, regulators and private litigators may start
their own investigations or feel pressure to expedite ongoing investigations. In some
cases, their actions lead to costly penalties, settlements, or damages. Other market
actors do not need to wait for lawsuits to be filed to act. Corporate boards can
independently investigate reports of misconduct and sack the managers responsible.
When executives expect that misconduct will be revealed by traders and penalized
by the market or the law, they will be less willing to commit misconduct ex ante.
This is how the information market creates the positive social externality of
deterrence.
Empirical research on corporate whistleblowers confirms that the market for
information about companies with traded securities facilitates the revelation of
misconduct. In a widely cited study, economists Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and
Luigi Zingales (DMZ) examined 216 cases of corporate frauds in large U.S.
companies between 1996 and 2004 to identify who revealed the fraud.206 They found
that the parties that the law directly tasks with preventing fraud—the SEC and private
litigants—are rarely the first to reveal misconduct.207 Instead, they found that
“detectors with monetary or career incentives are more likely to blow the whistle, as
are detectors with better access to information.”208 DMZ identified six groups that
blew the whistle in more than 10% of cases in their dataset: analysts, auditors,
employees, industry regulators, media, and short sellers.209 Three of these groups—
short sellers, analysts, and financial journalists—are attracted to companies with
tradable securities.
A. Short Sellers
Short sellers are investors who bet on declines in securities prices. A short seller
starts by taking out a loan. She uses the borrowed money to borrow shares from one

as costly signals).
206. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2213. DMZ’s study was limited to
companies with more than $750 million in assets, a group that was overwhelmingly public
companies during the period studied. See id.
207. See id. at 2225 (finding that fraud was detected by the SEC in 6.6% of cases and by
law firms in 3.3% of cases).
208. Id. at 2230.
209. Id. at 2225.
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of the existing shareholders of the company she wants to short.210 She promises to
return the borrowed shares on a fixed expiration date. Then she sells the borrowed
shares. When the expiration date arrives, she “covers” the short position by buying
the same number of shares she borrowed and returning them to their original
owner.211 If the price of the stock declines between when she sold and repurchased
the shares, the difference in price, minus the interest on the loan, becomes her profit.
Short selling is often a risky proposition. Short sellers must achieve gains that
more than offset the expected market return and the interest on the loan.212 The worst
thing that can happen to an investor taking a long position in a security is that its
price falls to zero. The short seller’s potential loss is theoretically infinite.213 A short
seller is also exposed to the risk of any unanticipated event that might cause the price
to rise between the sale and the repurchase.214 If the company being shorted pays a
dividend, a short seller must compensate the owner of their borrowed shares.215 The
owner also has a right to demand return of the shares at any time, so a short seller is
exposed to the risk that the short position will be closed prematurely.216 Companies
targeted by short sellers also sometimes fight back by suing them, seeking regulatory
action against them, or hiring private investigators.217 Nathan Anderson, the short
seller who exposed Nikola, has been repeatedly sued by companies he
investigated.218 Retail investors do not always like short sellers either, as the populist
campaign to squeeze the hedge funds shorting GameStop has illustrated.219
But despite their reputation, short sellers play an important role in the economy:
keeping public companies honest. The opportunity to profit from short selling fuels
the investigation of corporate misconduct. Even investors who exclusively take long
positions will find negative information valuable in deciding which stocks to avoid.

210. See SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: AN INTRODUCTION TO SHORT SALES (2015),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alertsbulletins/investor-bulletins-51 [https://perma.cc/8DVZ-QQQ7].
211. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 13, at 1338 n.14.
212. See id. at 1377 (explaining that “long positions in equity earn a risk premium over
time” (footnote omitted)).
213. See id.
214. One way to mitigate this risk is to hedge a short position with a long position in related
stocks. So, for example, if a short seller uncovered negative information about Delta and
wanted to short its stock, she might simultaneously take a long position of equal value in
United or in a basket of other airline stocks. In that case, she would be indifferent to events
that affected the airline industry as a whole. See Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Institutional
Investors as Short Sellers?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 837, 870–71 (2019) (describing how institutional
investors might offset some of the risks of short positions by taking a long position in the
stocks of another company in the industry).
215. SEC, supra note 210.
216. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 13, at 1378.
217. Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms, 2 REV. ASSET PRICING
STUD. 1, 1 (2012).
218. See Zuckerman, supra note 15.
219. See Matt Phillips & Taylor Lorenz, ‘Dumb Money’ Is on GameStop, and It’s Beating
Wall Street at Its Own Game, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/27/business/gamestop-wall-street-bets.html [https://perma.cc/BZR6-NB34] (Oct. 18,
2021).
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But short sellers stand to profit disproportionately from negative information about
a specific company.220 They have a greater incentive to invest the time and money to
substantiate their case against a potential target. Once they uncover information
about misconduct, they have an incentive to publicize that information quickly, so
that the price of the company’s stock declines before any unexpected positive news
intervenes to offset the decline.
There is strong empirical evidence that short sellers detect corporate misconduct.
For example, one study of 454 companies disciplined by the SEC for financial
misrepresentations between 1988 and 2005 found that 96% of those companies
experienced “negative abnormal returns on the days their misconduct was publicly
revealed, with an average 1-day stock price decline of 18.2%.”221 The study also
found that “abnormal short interest rises significantly in the 19-month period before
the misrepresentation is publicly revealed,” and the amount of short selling is
positively correlated with the severity of the misconduct.222 A more recent study
examined a pilot program that the SEC conducted in 2004 in which short selling
regulations were relaxed for certain randomly selected public companies.223
Companies subject to the relaxed regulations were more likely to be caught for
committing fraud.224 DMZ found that short sellers detected 14.5% of the frauds in
their dataset.225 Yet DMZ also found that short sellers were identified as the fraud
detector in media reports in only 3.5% of cases.226 The disparity suggests that many
short sellers prefer anonymity.
Not all short sellers choose to remain anonymous, though. Some short sellers use
publicity and reputation to draw attention to the information they reveal. Consider
short seller Bill Ackman. In 2012, Ackman announced that he had taken a short
position against the multi-level marketing company Herbalife.227 He simultaneously
released research claiming that the company was a “pyramid scheme.”228 Ackman
provided an analysis of Herbalife’s financial statements in which he showed that the
company’s distributors made only a small portion of their income from retail sales
and a large portion from aggressively recruiting new distributors.229 He also provided

220. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2222 (citation omitted) (“Short sellers
have a strong incentive to identify and disseminate bad news . . . .”).
221. Jonathan M. Karpoff & Xiaoxia Lou, Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct, 65 J.
FIN. 1879, 1880 (2010).
222. Id.
223. Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling and Earnings
Management: A Controlled Experiment, 71 J. FIN. 1251, 1251–52 (2016).
224. Id. at 1254.
225. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2225. Despite these numbers, DMZ seemed
unimpressed with short sellers’ performance as fraud detectors because short sellers “have the
strongest incentive to see fraud come to light.” Id. at 2226.
226. Id. at 2225.
227. William Alden, Ackman Outlines Bet Against Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Dec. 20, 2012, 2:08 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ackman-outlines-betagainst-herbalife/ [https://perma.cc/Y2DL-86X4].
228. PERSHING SQUARE CAP. MGMT., L.P., WHO WANTS TO BE A MILLIONAIRE? 64 (2012),
https://factsaboutherbalife.com/documents/Who-wants-to-be-a-Millionaire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D6M-EKW3].
229. See id. at 147–48.
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evidence that Herbalife lured financially unsophisticated individuals into becoming
distributors with misleading statements about the income they could earn.230 The
tactics Ackman used against Herbalife were controversial. At one point, it was
reported that federal prosecutors were investigating Ackman’s firm for market
manipulation.231 Ackman ultimately lost money on his short position.232
But from a social perspective, Ackman’s campaign was a success. In 2014, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that it had opened an investigation into
Herbalife’s business practices.233 In 2016, Herbalife reached a settlement with the
FTC in which it paid a $200 million fine and agreed to restructure its business so that
“[a]t least two-thirds of rewards paid by Herbalife to distributors [would] be based
on retail sales.”234 The settlement also “prohibits Herbalife from misrepresenting
distributors’ potential or likely earnings.”235Ackman may have been indifferent to
the welfare of the people that Herbalife deceived, but they were the long-run
beneficiaries of his campaign. If Herbalife had been private, Ackman would have
had no incentive to fund the research.
The threat of short selling improves management behavior. For example, the
study of the SEC pilot program found that companies selected for relaxed short-seller
regulations were significantly less likely to manipulate how they reported their
earnings.236 Corporate executives’ own statements suggest that short sellers constrain
their behavior. For example, Tesla is one of the most shorted companies in history.237
In 2018, the self-described “Shorty Air Force” raised questions about demand for
Tesla’s Model 3 by using drones to take photos of parking lots where Tesla was
storing its inventory. 238 When Tesla CEO Elon Musk briefly considered taking Tesla

230. See id. at 209–12 (showing exaggerated earnings claims); id. at 231–38 (targeting the
financially unsophisticated).
231. Christopher M. Matthews, Prosecutors Interview People Tied to Ackman in Probe of
Potential Herbalife Manipulation, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutorsinterview-people-tied-to-ackman-in-probe-of-potential-herbalife-manipulation-1426196822
[https://perma.cc/7URF-DQTZ] (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:18 PM).
232. See Matthew Goldstein, Ackman Ends His 5-Year Fight with Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Feb.
28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/
dealbook/ackman-herbalife-pershing-square.html [https://perma.cc/8V62-3E2Z].
233. Sara Germano & Brent Kendall, Federal Trade Commission Starts Herbalife Probe,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-trade-commission-starts-herbalife-probe1394646213 [https://perma.cc/9ARR-8ZZD] (Mar. 12, 2014, 3:42 PM).
234. Press Release, FTC, Herbalife Will Restructure Its Multi-Level Marketing Operations
and Pay $200 Million for Consumer Redress to Settle FTC Charges (July 15, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/07/herbalife-will-restructure-its-multilevel-marketing-operations [https://perma.cc/8VFT-WGZP].
235. Id.
236. Fang, Huang & Karpoff, supra note 223, at 1252–53.
237. See Crystal Kim, Tesla Shorts to Amass First-Ever $20 Billion Bet Against a Stock,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0709/tesla-shorts-to-amass-first-ever-20-billion-bet-against-a-stock [https://perma.cc/Y5W7LTP8].
238. See Neal E. Boudette, Unraveling a Tesla Mystery: Lots (and Lots) of Parked Cars,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/tesla-carsquestions.html [https://perma.cc/BD9W-FW6Z].
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private that year, he said that “as the most shorted stock in the history of the stock
market, being public means that there are large numbers of people who have the
incentive to attack the company.”239 What Musk hates, though he would not put it
this way, is that short sellers hold him accountable and keep him honest.
B. Analysts
The information market also subsidizes the work of financial analysts. Analysts
are investment advisors who research and make recommendations on specific
companies or industries. “Buy-side” analysts work for money managers like mutual
funds or hedge funds.240 They usually keep their recommendations confidential, so
that the money managers who employ them can attempt to beat the market.241 “Sellside” analysts work for brokerage firms and investment banks.242 They usually make
their recommendations public, so that their firms can attract more institutional
clients.243
Sell-side analyst recommendations account for a significant percentage of
changes in securities prices.244 This is an impressive testament to the quality of their
recommendations because institutional investors—who have their own buy-side
analysts—are the main price movers.245 In the aggregate, analysts’ recommendations
outperform the market.246 Sell-side analysts have, however, been criticized for being
biased in favor of positive recommendations.247 It is widely known that “buy” ratings
are more common than “sell” ratings.248 There is a larger audience for a buy

239. Elon
Musk,
Taking
Tesla
Private,
TESLA
(Aug.
7,
2018),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/taking-tesla-private [https://perma.cc/TVA7-SWMQ].
240. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39,
46 (2007); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 28, at 723.
241. See Fisch, supra note 240, at 46 (footnote omitted) (explaining that buy-side analysts
“produce research exclusively for the benefit of their employers”); Goshen & Parchomovsky,
supra note 28, at 723 (explaining that buy-side analysts “keep their analytical products
confidential and profit through trading based on discrepancies between their valuation and the
market price”).
242. Fisch, supra note 240, at 46; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 28, at 723.
243. See Fisch, supra note 240, at 52 (explaining that rules constraining firms’ ability “to
subsidize research through transactions with retail investors means that research is funded
largely if not exclusively by the firm’s institutional customers”); Goshen & Parchomovsky,
supra note 28, at 723 (“The coverage of sell-side analysts aims at attracting investors to the
covered stocks and firms to the investment bank.”).
244. See Fisch, supra note 240, at 60–61.
245. See id. at 61.
246. See id. at 63–64 (footnotes omitted) (“On the whole, analyst-recommended stocks
outperform the market, and this performance persists and is not a short-term reaction to the
recommendation itself.”).
247. Analysts also used to be suspected of slanting their recommendations to curry favor
with companies, so that the companies would disclose private information to them first. See
id. at 58. In 2000, the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which banned the practice of selective
disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2017).
248. See Stephen J. Choi, The Problems with Analysts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 161, 170–72 (2007)
(reviewing the empirical literature).
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recommendation (all potential buyers) than a sell recommendation (only current
shareholders).249 Analysts’ brokerage firm employers also earn more commissions if
more shares are sold.250 But ratings are not the only way to convey negative
information about a company. Analysts can send a negative signal by deciding to no
longer cover the company’s stock.251
In the DMZ study, sell-side analysts detected 13.8% of the frauds.252 DMZ found
that analysts who had been recognized as “all-stars” in the industry were more likely
to detect fraud.253 They did not find, however, that detecting fraud had significant
positive career effects for analysts.254 So why are analysts successful fraud detectors
even though they might not gain much professionally? DMZ hypothesized that
analysts simply “gather a lot of relevant information as a byproduct of their normal
work.”255 For example, analysts who are affiliated with investment banks can absorb
information through observing their banks’ operations.256
Analysts’ work fuels investigations of corporate misconduct. Consider Wirecard,
the German payments company. Wirecard grew rapidly in the 2010s and was added
to the DAX, an index of Germany’s thirty leading public companies.257 But analysts
who scrutinized Wirecard’s growth noticed a suspicious pattern in its financial
statements.258 Wirecard was spending hundreds of millions of euros buying small,
unprofitable businesses in Asia, which suddenly became highly profitable.259 After
analysts raised doubts, the Financial Times launched a years-long investigation into
the company.260 In 2019, the paper reported that Wirecard had developed a “roundtripping” scheme to inflate its revenue: money would leave Wirecard in Germany,
“show its face on the balance sheet of a dormant subsidiary in Hong Kong, depart to
sit momentarily in the books of an external ‘customer’, then travel back to Wirecard
in India, where it would look to local auditors like legitimate business revenue.”261
By 2020, Wirecard had unraveled under scrutiny and filed for insolvency.262
The primary victims of Wirecard’s misconduct were investors. But misconduct
that harms investors can be intertwined with misconduct that harms third parties.
Wells Fargo’s fake account scandal—for which it ultimately paid a $185 million

249. See Fisch, supra note 240, at 56.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 47.
252. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2225.
253. See id. at 2235–37.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 2228.
256. See Fisch, supra note 240, at 64.
257. See Liz Alderman & Christopher F. Schuetze, In a German Tech Giant’s Fall,
Charges of Lies, Spies and Missing Billions, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/business/wirecard-collapse-markus-braun.html
[https://perma.cc/JDD3-QR3V].
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Dan McCrum & Stefania Palma, Wirecard: Inside an Accounting Scandal, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d51a012e-1d6f-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65
[https://perma.cc/THM4-HWUK].
262. See Alderman & Schuetze, supra note 257.
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fine—is a good example.263 Before the scandal unfolded, “[a]nalysts ha[d] marveled
at the bank’s ability to cross-sell mortgages, credit cards and auto loans to
customers.”264 But the Los Angeles Times showed that Wells Fargo achieved these
cross-selling numbers by pressuring customers to sign up for accounts they did not
want and, in some cases, forging their signatures.265 Investors saw fake numbers
because customers got unwanted accounts. Likewise, Theranos sold fraudulent blood
tests to consumers and gave inflated revenue projections to business partners.266
Holmes may have felt the need to exaggerate revenue projections in part because the
technology could not do what she claimed it could do. If Theranos had disclosed
accurate financial statements, and analysts had scrutinized them, Holmes would have
found it harder to conceal the true state of the company’s technology.
C. Financial Journalists
Journalists, like analysts, have an incentive to learn about corporate misconduct
not because they trade on that information, but because traders fund their work. DMZ
found that journalists detected 13.2% of the frauds in their dataset.267 They found
that journalists are especially likely to detect frauds that lead to large settlements or
large fines.268 They also observed positive career effects for journalists who detect
fraud.269
Journalists, of course, cover both public and private companies. At first glance,
the Theranos, Uber, and Juul cases may seem to reflect well on the media.
Undoubtedly, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal deserve praise for
their reporting. But it is worth noting that in each case, the misconduct was revealed
years after it happened, and the journalists would not have uncovered the misconduct
without the help of employee whistleblowers. Before Carreyrou’s exposé in October
2015, Theranos had received highly favorable media coverage. Holmes was on the
cover of Forbes and Fortune.270 Even the New Yorker profile of Holmes that raised
Adam Clapper’s suspicions was largely positive.271
Financial journalists—like the journalists at the Financial Times who uncovered
the round-tripping at Wirecard—are more likely to cover a company with tradable

263. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/
business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html
[https://perma.cc/U6DV-MGXH].
264. Id.
265. E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargosale-pressure-20131222-story.html [https://perma.cc/FTK5-8XQN].
266. See CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 48–50 (explaining how Theranos’s head of sales
and marketing grew skeptical of the revenue projections Holmes made to drugmakers).
267. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2225.
268. Id. at 2226.
269. Id. at 2239–40.
270. See CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 208–10.
271. See Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/blood-simpler [https://perma.cc/2DZ4V5ZX].

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 149

6/15/22 12:57 PM

1232

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1203

securities because the company’s current and prospective investors form an audience
willing to pay for high-quality journalism. Journalists also cover those companies
differently. Like analysts, good financial journalists combine analysis of company
disclosures with independent research to help traders process information relevant to
the pricing of tradable securities. They develop the technical skills needed to make
sense of information buried in dense accounting statements.
To be sure, there is no bright line between financial journalism and general
interest journalism. E. Scott Reckard, the Los Angeles Times business reporter who
wrote the exposé of Wells Fargo, told the Columbia Journalism Review that his
editors “always insisted on having a real consumer focus in their reporting. It was
always hard to get the higher-up editors interested in what you might call pure
business stories, giant banks creating derivatives.”272 Reckard said that his editors’
limited interest in pure business stories created good incentives, because it “forced
[him] to go out and tell stories from the perspective of employees and customers on
the front lines.”273 But Reckard’s investigation was facilitated by his ability to
examine Wells Fargo’s financial statements and explain to his readers that Wells
Fargo was “brag[ging] in earnings reports of its prowess in ‘cross-selling.’”274
Venture-backed startups would greatly benefit from the attention of analysts and
financial journalists. The opacity of private company financial statements creates
opportunities for manipulation. Some late-stage startups pitched to investors by using
accounting metrics that do not conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), like “bookings” or “billings” or using a definition of “revenue” that
includes payments to third parties.275 In 2015, reporters at the Wall Street Journal
“compared sales figures and projections made by 50 tech companies when they were
private with financial results reported later for the same period.”276 They found that
in fifteen cases, the companies later reported lower numbers, and in six of those
cases, “the difference was caused by using more conservative accounting
measurements when the companies went public.”277 These discrepancies might never
have been revealed if the companies’ financial statements had never been subject to
outside scrutiny.
D. Employees
A company’s employees usually have better access to information about its
misconduct than outsiders do. Employees detected the fraud first in 17.1% of the

272. Pete Vernon, Q&A: Former LA Times Reporter on Story that Led to $185 Million
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Sept.
12,
2016),
Wells
Fargo
Fine,
COLUM.
https://www.cjr.org/q_and_a/wells_fargo_la_times_accounts.php [https://perma.cc/93KM9EUN].
273. Id.
274. Reckard, supra note 265.
275. See Telis Demos, Shira Ovide & Susan Pulliam, Tech Startups Woo Investors with
Unconventional Financial Metrics—but Do Numbers Add Up?, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2015,
10:41
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tech-startups-play-the-numbers-game1433903883 [https://perma.cc/RCU5-4ZPY].
276. Id.
277. Id.
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cases in the DMZ study.278 But employee whistleblowers risk social ostracism,
demotion, termination, and other forms of retaliation. In the DMZ study, in the cases
in which an employee detected the fraud, the whistleblower chose to conceal his or
her identity 37% of the time.279 Anonymity is often a wise decision. Of the employee
whistleblowers whose identities were revealed, 82% were “fired, quit under duress,
or had significantly altered responsibilities.”280
Theranos tried to intimidate its whistleblowers. Boies Schiller, Theranos’s outside
counsel, pressured Tyler Shultz to sign an affidavit stating that he “had never spoken
to any third parties about Theranos and that he pledged to give the names of every
current and former employee who he knew had talked to the Journal.”281 When he
refused, a Boies Schiller litigator “let it be known that if Tyler didn’t sign the
affidavit and name the Journal’s sources, the firm would make sure to bankrupt his
entire family when it took him to court.”282 Shultz heard that private investigators
were surveilling him.283 Boies Schiller also had a man approach Erika Cheung
unexpectedly in the parking lot of her new workplace with a threatening letter.284
Employee whistleblowers who are reluctant to publicize misconduct themselves
may find a trader, an analyst, or a financial journalist who is motivated to reveal the
misconduct. Consider the famous case of Dirks v. SEC.285 In 1973, analyst Raymond
Dirks got a tip from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America,
that the company was overstating its assets as a result of fraud.286 Secrist told Dirks
that Equity Funding employees had brought this information to the attention of
regulatory agencies, but the regulators had failed to act.287 Secrist “urged Dirks to
verify the fraud and disclose it publicly.”288 Dirks visited Equity Funding to
investigate. The company’s senior managers denied the charges, but other employees
corroborated them.289 Dirks also tried to persuade the Wall Street Journal to report
on the charges. The Los Angeles bureau chief declined, saying that he did not believe
“that such a massive fraud could go undetected.”290
During his investigation, Dirks shared the information about Equity Funding with
his clients and other investors.291 Some of those investors sold the stock.292 Equity
Funding’s stock price slid from $26 to less than $15 per share.293 The price decline
spurred action. The SEC filed a complaint against the company, and the Wall Street

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
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Journal belatedly published the information that Dirks had shared.294 The SEC
censured Dirks for insider trading, and Dirks challenged the censure all the way up
to the Supreme Court.295
The Court sided with Dirks. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that
Dirks had “no pre-existing fiduciary duty” to Equity Funding.296 He reasoned that
Dirks did not create any expectation that he would keep the company’s information
confidential and had not misappropriated the information or obtained it illegally.297
The Court held that Secrist and the other Equity Funding employees did not breach
a duty either because they “received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing
Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable
information to Dirks.”298 Instead, the Court found “the tippers were motivated by a
desire to expose the fraud.”299
Dirks makes it clear that tippees who learn of material, nonpublic information
about corporate misconduct from insiders can legally trade on that information, as
long as (1) the tippees do not have a preexisting duty to the company, and (2) the
tippers are not motivated by a quid pro quo. Dirks therefore protects a valuable
channel for publicizing misconduct. Employee whistleblowers just need to find
someone with a megaphone who stands to profit from trading on the misconduct,
like a short seller or an analyst, and they can reveal it. The facts of Dirks also show
how regulators, and even journalists, may be reluctant to act until the publicity and
credibility of a market signal embarrasses them.
E. Regulators and Litigators
Regulators and private litigators play a critical role in deterring corporate
misconduct by ensuring that public revelations lead to financial consequences. But
they usually rely on third parties to reveal the misconduct first. DMZ found that
private litigators detected only 3.3% of the frauds in their dataset.300 The SEC
detected only 6.6%.301 Industry regulators fared better than the SEC, detecting 13.2%
of the frauds.302 DMZ attributed this disparity to industry regulators having greater
access to information about the businesses they regulate as a byproduct of their
routine interactions.303
DMZ’s results match common sense. Individual regulators will rarely value the
information they acquire about their regulatory targets as much as society would.304

294. Id.
295. Id. at 651–52.
296. Id. at 665.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 667.
299. Id.
300. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2225.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2228.
304. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1432 (2011) (“[A] government agent’s private marginal benefit from
additional research may often be systematically lower than the social marginal benefit of such
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Regulators respond to political incentives, not financial incentives.305 Regulators face
political pressure to act after misconduct has been revealed, not before it is revealed.
Securities litigators do respond to financial incentives, but their incentives kick in
after misconduct has been revealed. Securities litigators are compensated by
contingency fees paid out of settlements, which are based on expected damages.
Damages in securities fraud cases are calculated based on stock price declines.306
Only after misconduct has been revealed and share prices have fallen will securities
litigators be confident that a securities fraud suit is valuable. Hunting for potential
misconduct that could lead to a stock price decline later is not a profitable use of their
time.
It may appear like regulators and litigators play a larger role in uncovering
misconduct because they often lead the investigations in which the details of
misconduct are revealed. But these investigations are usually triggered by earlier,
partial revelations of misconduct. The initial revelations enable regulators and
litigators to obtain subpoenas, which give them access to documents and depositions
that produce the more detailed revelations. DMZ’s data show that regulators and
litigators rely on others to provide the initial revelations.
There is one kind of litigation that does create incentives for initial revelations—
qui tam suits. The False Claims Act imposes liability for companies that defraud the
government.307 The statute’s qui tam provision allows whistleblowers, who are
usually employees, to bring suit on behalf of the government and receive between 15
and 25 percent of the damages or settlement.308 DMZ measured the effect of qui tam
suits on fraud detection by examining the health care industry, which relies on
government contracts.309 They found that “employees reveal the fraud in 41% of
cases in the health care industry but only in 14% of cases in industries where the qui
tam suits are not available.”310 Qui tam suits, though, are the exception. In most cases,
regulators and litigators need the information market to reveal the misconduct.311

research . . . .”).
305. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 380–86 (2000) (reviewing social scientific
theories of bureaucratic behavior and expressing skepticism that individual government actors
are motivated by damages paid out of public funds).
306. See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH U. L. REV. 487, 503 (2015) (explaining that damages in
securities fraud class actions are usually calculated by event studies that measure the decline
in share price between a misstatement and the time that it is corrected).
307. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
308. Id. § 3730(d).
309. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 9, at 2246.
310. Id.
311. Verity Winship has persuasively argued that public company whistleblower bounties
should be expanded to private company whistleblowers. See Verity Winship, Private
Company Fraud, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 712–23 (2020). But bounties would only work
in certain circumstances. The incentives they create are attenuated by time and risk. An
employee must reveal the misconduct and hope that the SEC not only decides to pursue the
action but also prevails or reaches a favorable settlement. Even if private company employee
whistleblowers were given legal protection against retaliation, they would still face the social
ostracism that public company whistleblowers report. Whistleblower bounties would also only
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III. UNDERDETERRENCE OF UNICORN MISCONDUCT
Private companies are less deterred from misconduct than their public
counterparts because there is no comparable market for information about them.
Securities regulation restricts the sale and resale of private company securities. The
secondary markets where private company securities are traded are highly illiquid,
low volume, and opaque. They do not create opportunities for short sellers, and they
have not attracted many analysts and financial journalists. In late-stage startups, the
absence of robust trading in their securities combines with the economics of VC
investing to undermine deterrence.
A. Venture Capitalists
VCs have considerable power over the startups they fund. VCs invest in stages,
funding twelve to twenty-four months of a startup’s life in each round.312 VCs gain
leverage over entrepreneurs by their credible threat to not reinvest in subsequent
rounds.313 VCs also syndicate their investments.314 A VC firm’s willingness to vouch
for its portfolio company is critical to soliciting other VC firms to join a syndicate.315
VCs often serve on a startup’s board of directors. In most startups, the VCs and
founders share control of the board.316 In some startups, VCs control the board
outright.317 After each funding round, one of the newly added VCs usually takes a

apply to misconduct that fits the definition of securities fraud. By contrast, a market for trading
securities encourages the revelation of any misconduct that would affect the price of a
company’s securities.
312. See Gilson, supra note 56, at 1078–81 (explaining why VCs use staged financing);
Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 70 (stating that startups raise funds every twelve to twentyfour months).
313. See Gilson, supra note 56, at 1079 (footnote omitted) (“If the portfolio company does
not meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of financing, the
venture capital fund has the power to shut the project down by declining to fund the project’s
next round.”).
314. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of
the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 55–56 (2006) (explaining how and why VCs syndicate
their investments).
315. See id. at 56 (footnote omitted) (explaining that in a startup fundraising round, “[a]
new investor may use the willingness of existing investors to co-invest as a signal of the
company’s perceived quality among its existing investors”).
316. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 289–
90 (2003) (finding, in a study of 213 investments in 119 startups by 14 VC firms, that 25% of
boards were VC-controlled, 14% were founder-controlled, and 61% were controlled by
neither).
317. See id.
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seat on the startup’s board.318 VC directors are expected to take an active role in
governance and to provide management advice.319
VCs have the power to prevent misconduct at their portfolio companies and the
power to expose misconduct at startups they vet. But VCs lack the incentive to use
their power to deter misconduct because of their asymmetric risk preferences, the
auction-like structure of their investments, and social norms that discourage them
from publicly criticizing startups.
1. Asymmetric Risk Preferences
Venture capital is a home run industry. VCs invest their funds in a portfolio of
startups with the expectation that most will generate only modest or negative returns,
but one or a few will generate exponential returns that will offset all the others.320
Consequently, VCs are motivated to fund companies with upside potential and are
largely indifferent to downside risk. VCs are also partially insulated from downside
risk because the preferred stock they purchase carries a liquidation preference.321 The
liquidation preference usually ensures that if the startup is sold, VCs receive back
what they invested before founders or employees receive anything.322
VCs’ asymmetric risk preferences influence which startups they are willing to
fund. From a VC’s perspective, the financial difference between a portfolio company
that implodes in scandal and the many that simply never develop a product or find a
market niche is not significant.323 In either case, the failed startup is just one of the
many startups in the VC’s portfolio that did not generate an exponential return. What
VCs care about is upside potential. A VC might see a startup like Uber, with a
founder willing to cross ethical lines, as having above average downside risk but also
above average upside potential.324 Tim Draper offered similar reasoning to defend
his investment in Theranos, telling CNBC that “when I’m an investor in a startup, I
assume that 60% of them are going to go out of business . . . I make my money on a
few really extraordinary companies. Theranos was one of those extraordinary
companies that could have been one of these big, huge winners.”325

318. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315,
326 (2005) (“[V]enture capitalists typically gain additional board seats with each round of
investment . . . .”).
319. See Gilson, supra note 56, at 1072 (explaining that VCs are expected to provide their
portfolio companies with “management assistance, corresponding to that provided by
management consultants”).
320. See Dixon, supra note 24 (explaining the extreme lopsidedness of VC returns).
321. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 316, at 288 (finding that in all but one of the
contracts in their dataset, “VCs have claims that in liquidation are senior to the common stock
claims of the founders”).
322. See id. at 290 (finding that in 98% of the funding rounds, “the claims of the VCs in
liquidation are typically at least as large as the original investments”).
323. Pollman, supra note 8, at 392 (“[F]or a VC it might make little difference if a loss in
the portfolio comes from a company that made material misstatements or one that simply
failed to successfully execute the business plan or develop technology . . . .”).
324. See id. (footnote omitted) (“[O]n the whole [VCs] might prefer to invest in teams and
companies that push boundaries even if that means that some will cross the line.”).
325. VC Draper: Theranos Founder Elizabeth Holmes Was Bullied into Submission,
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VCs’ asymmetric risk preferences lead them to tolerate startups that grow at an
unsustainably rapid pace. Reid Hoffman, the cofounder of LinkedIn and a partner at
the VC firm Greylock, calls it “blitzscaling.”326 Hoffman told the Harvard Business
Review: “When you’re blitzscaling, a whole bunch of things are inevitably broken,
and you can’t work on them all at once. You have to triage. You fix the things that
will get investors to give you more cash.”327 Hoffman’s examples of things that might
get broken are anodyne.328 If a startup’s product is a platform for making business
connections over the internet, that may be the worst thing that can happen. If the
product is a blood test, deferring fixing problems in the rush of blitzscaling can have
more serious consequences.
VCs need not tell their portfolio companies to break the law. It is highly unlikely
that VCs told Uber’s executives to spy on regulators or Juul’s executives to market
their product to minors. It is almost certain that Theranos’s VCs did not tell Holmes
to misrepresent the state of the company’s technology.329 After all, the board tried to
remove her for misleading them.330 Founders just need to understand that the
economics of VC investing rely on exponential growth. Then founders will “fix the
things that will get investors to give [them] more cash.”
Investors in late-stage startups may have less skewed risk preferences. Earlystage startups primarily raise money from VCs, but late-stage startups have taken
investment from mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and other institutional
investors.331 A late-stage startup’s potential for exponential growth may be weaker,
and its equity will be more expensive. Accordingly, downside risk may factor more
into the expected value of the investment. It is a cliché in Silicon Valley that
companies try to “clean up” before an IPO and the revelations that the enhanced
scrutiny of public markets will bring.332 For example, in 2017, two years before its
IPO, Uber replaced Travis Kalanick with Dara Khosrowshahi and gave him “a
mandate to clean up the mess left by the company’s exiled founder.”333 The
sensitivities of late-stage investors, however, do not prevent unicorns from doing

CNBC (May 10, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/05/10/vc-drapertheranos-founder-elizabeth-holmes-was-bullied-into-submission.html
[https://perma.cc/5JPW-Z5NR].
326. See Tim Sullivan, Blitzscaling, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2016, at 45, 46.
327. Id. at 50.
328. See id.
329. See CARREYROU, supra note 5, at 296–99 (concluding that Holmes “channeled” the
“fake-it-until-you-make-it culture” of Silicon Valley, but that she was firmly in control of the
company and manipulated others, including VC Don Lucas).
330. See id. at 50–51.
331. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 175 (2019).
332. See, e.g., Jeff Jordan, 16 Things CEOs Should Do Before an IPO, TECHCRUNCH (Aug.
22, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/22/16-things-ceos-should-do-beforean-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/LR26-8W2G] (recommending that startups planning IPOs “clean
up” their capitalization table, add independent directors, hire a reputable accounting firm, and
decide whether founders will have control).
333. Mike Isaac, With Uber’s I.P.O., Dara Khosrowshahi Is Taking Travis Kalanick’s
Company Public, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/
technology/uber-ipo-ceo-dara-khosrowshahi-travis-kalanick.html [https://perma.cc/7MQGPKAQ].
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damage before the IPO draws near. After all, if the incentive effect of the IPO
extended back all the way to the company’s founding, there would be no need to
clean up the company’s mistakes in the first place.
2. The Winner’s Curse
VCs are selective in making investments. The typical VC firm will fund only a
small percentage of the startups it screens.334 VCs conduct due diligence before they
invest, and they typically receive financial statements as part of the process.335 Some
unicorns, however, have provided little information to investors in later rounds.336
When Uber pitched itself to prospective investors in 2016, it gave them no financial
statements, just a list of risk factors.337 Some observers claim that the increased
availability of VC financing and competition among VCs for promising startups is
undermining incentives to conduct thorough due diligence.338 Due diligence could—
and sometimes does—lead VCs to screen out startups that have committed
misconduct or appear to have a propensity to do so. The problem is that due diligence
would need to turn off all deep-pocketed prospective investors for a startup to be
pushed out of business.
VC fundraising works like an auction. If ten investors review a public company,
and nine think the company is overvalued, its stock price will likely decline, because
some of the investors will bet against it. But if ten VC firms vet a startup, and nine
decide it is a bad investment, the startup will raise its round from the one contrarian
VC firm. The VC firm that bids highest in the auction experiences the winner’s curse:
it will have overestimated the startup’s value, at least relative to the field.339 The

334. See, e.g., Stan. Grad. Sch. of Bus., Marc Andreessen on Big Breakthrough Ideas and
at
17:21–18:24
(Mar.
8,
2014),
Courageous
Entrepreneurs,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYYsXzt1VDc
[https://perma.cc/X5Y4-MVR9]
(claiming that each year Andreessen Horowitz screens 3,000 opportunities, vets “a couple
hundred,” and funds twenty).
335. See Fan, supra note 23, at 605 (footnote omitted) (explaining that under the National
Venture Capital Association’s Model Investors’ Rights Agreement, “a company is required to
provide major investors with year-end, quarterly, and monthly financial statements, as well as
budgets and business plans”).
336. See Bill Gurley, On the Road to Recap: Why the Unicorn Financing Market Just
Became Dangerous…for All Involved, ABOVE THE CROWD (Apr. 21, 2016),
https://abovethecrowd.com/2016/04/21/on-the-road-to-recap/
[https://perma.cc/X64SXVGW] (lamenting the “relative absence of pertinent financial information” disclosed to
investors in unicorns).
337. See Julie Verhage, Here’s What Morgan Stanley Is Telling Its Wealthiest Clients
(Jan.
14,
2016,
9:42
AM),
About
Uber,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-14/here-s-what-morgan-stanley-is-tellingits-wealthiest-clients-about-uber [https://perma.cc/N34U-BU7S].
338. See Kate Clark, The Dark Side of the Funding Boom: Skimpy Due Diligence, Burnout,
INFO. (Aug. 12, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/the-dark-side-ofthe-funding-boom-skimpy-due-diligence-burnout [https://perma.cc/B2L7-UFA8].
339. Joseph Bankman and Ronald Gilson have argued that VC investments result in a
winner’s curse. Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289,
298 (1999). They use the term to describe the result of an auction between a VC and an
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auction-winning VC firm may be especially credulous or reckless. To be sure,
startups can raise more capital if more VC firms offer competing term sheets. But in
VC investing, what ultimately matters is the highest bid, not the market consensus.
In the classical version of the winner’s curse, the curse ends with the winner who
overestimated the value of the good being auctioned. But in VC markets, the winner’s
curse can have social consequences when it allows excessively risky startups to be
funded. Juul exemplifies the problem. The startup pitched itself to many VCs in
Silicon Valley, and most chose to pass.340 Instead, it was able to raise funds from a
small number of obscure VCs, hedge funds, and mutual funds.341
VC markets’ capacity to fund ideas that are speculative or controversial can create
private wealth and social value. VCs pride themselves on finding investment
opportunities that challenge conventional wisdom.342 They lament the times they
missed out because they followed the crowd. The VC firm Bessemer features its
“Anti-Portfolio” on its website: a list of the successful companies that the firm
considered but ultimately passed on.343 The Anti-Portfolio includes the story of a
Bessemer partner telling Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin, “Kid, haven’t you
heard of Friendster? Move on. It’s over!”344 In other cases, though, the contrarian
VCs funding a startup’s next round may simply be missing or choosing to ignore the
red flags that led other VCs to pass. If due diligence raises questions about whether
a startup has misled its business partners, and all but one VC firm balks, the startup
still gets funded.
3. Norm of Silence
When VCs pass on investment, they tend to do so quietly.345 Likewise, when VCs
decide not to reinvest, they rarely broadcast their decisions. VCs are known for their

entrepreneur in which the winning VC is cursed by paying more than the better-informed
entrepreneur would pay for her own ideas. Id. I use the term to describe an auction among VCs
in which the winning VC is cursed by overestimating the value of the startup relative to other
VCs.
340. See Erin Griffith, Silicon Valley Investors Shunned Juul, but Back Other Nicotine
TIMES
(Oct.
7,
2018),
Start-Ups,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/technology/silicon-valley-investors-juul-nicotinestart-ups.html [https://perma.cc/X89T-JBL7].
341. See id.; see also Juul: Financials, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/
organization/juul/company_financials [https://perma.cc/4MAC-T25Z] (listing Juul’s known
investors).
342. See, e.g., Geoff Lewis & Eric Stromberg, In Search of Narrative Violations,
BEDROCK, http://www.bedrockcap.com/letter [https://perma.cc/MLF5-M3FM] (proclaiming
that their new VC firm will “invest in promising companies that are underestimated precisely
because they are incongruent with the storyline”).
343. The Anti-Portfolio, BESSEMER VENTURE PARTNERS, https://www.bvp.com/antiportfolio [https://perma.cc/4EYB-R39W] (listing opportunities that the firm missed, including
Apple, Facebook, and Google, and lamenting, “if we had invested in any of these companies,
we might not still be working”).
344. Id.
345. See Erin Griffith, Should Venture Capitalists Avoid Publicly Criticizing Startups?,
FORTUNE (July 12, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://fortune.com/2017/07/12/venture-capital-
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few spectacularly successful investments, not for the vast majority that fail or
underwhelm. What VCs fear the most is that deal flow will dry up. They compete to
be “founder-friendly.”346 VCs who publicly criticize startups they passed on would
be less likely to attract a pitch from the next promising founder. Recall that Bill Maris
spoke out about Theranos only after Carreyrou’s exposé was published.347 VCs who
lack Maris’s reputation and institutional support may be reluctant to speak out at
all.348 In 2019, Jason Palmer, a less well-known VC focused on educational
technology, tweeted about why his firm had passed on the failed startup AltSchool.349
Palmer was excoriated online, including by the founder of TechCrunch.350 Palmer
apologized profusely.351
VCs’ practice of not revealing negative information they learn about startups
during the investment process is more remarkable because VCs routinely refuse to
sign NDAs.352 VCs claim they cannot sign NDAs because the number of startups
they screen makes it impractical to keep track of where they absorbed certain
information.353 They also claim that NDAs would create potential conflicts of interest
because they often screen multiple startups working on similar technologies or
exploring similar business models.354 Startups generally share sensitive information
with VCs in spite of their refusal to sign NDAs because they expect that social norms
will prevent VCs from revealing that information. But there is no legal obligation
preventing VCs from revealing what they learn or even trading on it.
VCs’ practice of not revealing negative information they learn about startups in
the investment process can have social consequences. Maris’s comments about
Theranos may have been self-serving, but it is likely true that many VCs looked at
Theranos, decided it was suspicious, passed on investing, and kept quiet. If Theranos
had been publicly traded, Maris or his colleagues could have acted on the suspicious
blood test and shorted the stock. The negative information about Theranos would
have been reflected in its stock price. A sharp decline in price might have attracted
more scrutiny to Theranos. Instead, because the VCs keep their doubts to themselves,
Theranos continued to sell fake blood tests.

criticize-startups/ [https://perma.cc/9N9X-VB8Z] (acknowledging the norm against VCs
criticizing startups, but also suggesting it may be changing).
346. See Ben Marcus, What Makes a Founder-Friendly Investor?, MEDIUM (Apr. 10,
2016),
https://medium.com/@FlyingBenji/what-makes-a-founder-friendly-investor6573b770cf18 [https://perma.cc/6WE9-64E6].
347. See D’Onfro, supra note 129.
348. To be sure, the norm is not absolute. Multiple VCs have criticized Juul. See Griffith,
supra note 345.
349. Nellie Bowles, Want to Do Business in Silicon Valley? Better Act Nice, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/style/oh-behave.html [https://perma.cc/MA9S-7JYF]
(Sept. 20, 2019).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See Lincoln, supra note 25.
353. See id.
354. See id. (“Adhering to hundreds of NDAs . . . would create untenable conflicts and
may prevent investors from offering candid industry advice and guidance to existing portfolio
companies, which may conflict with the investor’s fiduciary duties to these portfolio
companies.”).
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B. Restraints on Tradability
VCs’ weak incentives to deter startup misconduct would not be so consequential
if other investors had the opportunity to profit from uncovering and revealing
negative information about startups. But private company securities are not widely
traded, and they are nearly impossible to short. The Securities Act provides that all
offers or sales of securities must be registered with the SEC or subject to an
exemption.355 The Act exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering.”356 In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court interpreted that
language to mean that a transaction would be exempted only if the offerees could
“fend for themselves” and therefore did not need the protections of the securities
laws.357 The Court suggested that offerees could fend for themselves if they had
access to the kind of information about a company that would be provided in public
disclosures.358 Over time, an investor’s wealth has become the regulatory proxy for
whether the investors can fend for themselves.359
Most startups offering private placements of their equity to outsiders rely on the
Rule 506(b) safe harbor in Regulation D.360 In fact, in 2018, companies raised more
capital through Rule 506(b) than they did through registered public offerings.361 Rule
506(b) permits the sale of private securities to an unlimited number of “accredited
investors” and no more than thirty-five unaccredited investors.362Accredited
investors include, among others, VC firms, financial institutions, and businesses with
assets over $5 million.363 A person who has an annual income over $200,000 or a net
worth over $1 million also qualifies.364 Because the income and net worth tests have
not been indexed for inflation, thirteen percent of U.S. households now qualify as
accredited investors.365 If the tests had been adjusted for inflation from the start, an

355. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
356. Id. § 77d(a)(2).
357. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
358. See id. at 127.
359. See Rodrigues, supra note 26, at 3418–21.
360. Jones, supra note 36, at 176 (“Most private financing transactions proceed under Rule
506 of Regulation D . . . .”).
361. See Concept Release, supra note 30, at 30,465–66 (estimating that in 2018, $1.4
trillion was raised through registered public offerings and $1.5 trillion was raised through
Regulation 506(b)).
362. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2020).
363. See id. § 230.501(a)(1)–(3).
364. Id. § 230.501(a)(6) (including in the definition of accredited investor “[a]ny natural
person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent
years or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years
and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year”); id.
§ 230.501(a)(5) (including in the definition of accredited investor “[a]ny natural person whose
individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, exceeds $1,000,000”). A
person’s primary residence does not count for the net worth calculation. Id. §
230.501(a)(5)(i)(A).
365. Concept Release, supra note 30, at 30,471.
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investor would need an annual income of approximately $538,000 or a net worth of
approximately $2.7 million to qualify today.366
Startups may also sell shares or options to employees, directors, and officers as
part of a “compensatory benefit plan” under the safe harbor of Rule 701.367 Sales
under Rule 701 during any twelve-month period must not exceed the greatest of $1
million, fifteen percent of the company’s assets, or fifteen percent of the outstanding
amount of the class of shares being offered.368 Rule 701 also provides that if the
aggregate sales price of the securities that a startup sells during any twelve-month
period exceeds $10 million, it must provide purchasers with certain information,
including financial statements.369
Shares that are sold under Rules 506 and 701 are “restricted securities,” which are
not freely tradable.370 Any resale of a restricted security must itself be exempt from
registration.371 Holders of restricted startup shares generally rely on the safe harbor
for resales in Rule 144.372 Rule 144 permits the resale of restricted securities after a
one-year holding period.373 If the seller is an affiliate of the company, the seller must
provide specified information, including certain financial statements, to the
purchaser.374
In 2015, Congress enacted a new exemption for resales in section 4(a)(7) of the
Securities Act.375 It provides that restricted securities can be resold to accredited
investors without a holding period, provided that certain requirements are met.376 The
most important requirement is that the seller makes available to the purchaser certain
information about the company that issued the securities.377
Private companies must also be careful to avoid inadvertently triggering public
company status under section 12(g)’s record shareholder rule. Section 12(g) provides
that a company must register its securities once it accumulates assets exceeding $10

366. Tara Siegel Bernard, Opening the Door to Unicorns Invites Risk for Average
Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/yourmoney/investing-private-market-startups.html [https://perma.cc/HG4F-FX7D].
367. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(c) (2020).
368. Id. § 230.701(d)(2)(i)–(iii).
369. Id. § 230.701(e).
370. Id. §§ 230.502(d), 230.701(g)(1).
371. See id. §§ 230.502(d), 230.701(g)(2).
372. A second safe harbor, Rule 144A, permits the resale of restricted securities without a
holding period, but only if the buyer is a “qualified institutional buyer” (QIB). Id. §§
230.144A(b), 230.144A(d)(1). A QIB includes institutional investors that own and invest at
least $100 million in securities. Id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). In 2007, investment banks developed
markets for trading Rule 144A equity securities. See Sjostrom, supra note 47, at 430–32. But
the markets never generated significant liquidity, likely because they were limited to QIBs.
See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 562–63.
373. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii) (2020).
374. See id. §§ 230.144(b)(2), 230.144(c)(2). An affiliate is “a person that directly, or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with” the company issuing the security. Id. § 230.144(a)(1).
375. See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1787
(2015).
376. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(d).
377. See id. § 77d(d)(3).

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 161

6/15/22 12:57 PM

1244

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1203

million and 2000 record shareholders or 500 record shareholders who are not
accredited investors.378 A record shareholder is the person in whose name the share
is held, rather than its beneficial owner.379 But an SEC rule provides that “[i]f the
issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding securities of record is
used primarily to circumvent the provisions of section 12(g) . . . the beneficial owners
of such securities shall be deemed to be the record owners.”380
The net effect of these regulations is that private companies must monitor sales
and resales of their securities closely. Startups comply in part by encumbering their
shares with a right of first refusal in favor of the company.381 State corporate law
generally permits restraints on share alienability that are “reasonable.”382 Many
startups also regulate the sale of their stock by company policy. One recent study of
thirty-four private companies traded on the secondary markets found that eighty-six
percent of those companies required their employees to obtain company approval
before selling their shares.383 Rights of first refusal and company approval policies
are sensible means to comply with securities regulations, but they also enable
companies to monitor who is buying or selling its shares and make it impractical to
short the shares.
C. Secondary Markets
In the last two decades, organized secondary markets for buying and selling
private company shares have emerged.384 The secondary markets are limited by the
regulatory restrictions on trading private company securities and by the preferences
of companies themselves. In their early stages, some of the secondary markets
modeled themselves as marketplaces. For example, SecondMarket used to connect

378. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A). For the purpose of counting the number of record
shareholders, employees who received their shares as part of an employee compensation plan
do not count. Id. § 78l(g)(5).
379. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 28, at 355–56 (criticizing the definition of
record shareholder).
380. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5–1(b)(3) (2020).
381. See Fan, supra note 23, at 597 (describing the Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale
Agreement in the National Venture Capital Association’s template documents); Ibrahim,
supra note 1, at 44 (reporting that secondary market participants interviewed by the author
stated that “stock option grants to start-up employees typically include rights of first refusal”);
David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan & Edward Watts, Cashing It In: Private-Company Exchanges
and Employee Stock Sales Prior to IPO 3 (Stan. Univ. Grad. Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No.
18-45,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247877
[https://perma.cc/5DTG-8JFR] (reporting that many private companies interviewed by the
authors “specified that their company has right of first refusal on the shares”).
382. Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice
in Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 607 (2005). See also id. (listing compliance
with “exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act” as an example of
restrictions on share alienability).
383. Larcker, Tayan & Watts, supra note 381, at 9. In 41% of cases, the board controlled
approval. Id. The remainder split between the CEO, CFO, GC, or the HR department. Id.
384. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 16–20; Pollman, supra note 84, at 193–202.
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buyers and sellers in a common marketplace.385 SharesPost started as a passive
bulletin board that allowed users to post offers to buy or sell shares.386
Over time, the secondary markets evolved to allow companies tighter control of
how their shares are bought and sold. Today, SecondMarket is called NASDAQ
Private Market, and its business model is to work directly with private companies to
facilitate secondary block sales.387 SharesPost is now a registered broker-dealer.388 It
warns its customers that it does not provide a “formal, central marketplace where
pricing from prior trades is published.”389 Newer secondary markets like EquityZen
and Forge developed a different model for secondary transactions. They create
special funds that serve as investment vehicles to purchase startup equity, and they
solicit investors to become limited partners in the fund.390
Why did the markets evolve this way? The regulations on restricted securities set
some limits on tradability, but companies have discretion to limit trading further. The
market organizers want to stay in the good graces of the companies with shares traded
on their platforms, so they cooperate with company policies. It is in the self-interest
of a company’s directors and managers to adopt a policy of selective liquidity. A
company’s board can approve one-off sales for directors and managers when they
need liquidity. Investor directors should have an incentive to oppose liquidity deals
for managers that leaves them with too little skin in the game.391
In recent years, some founders have nonetheless cashed out equity worth
staggering amounts. For example, in 2018, Travis VanderZanden, the founder of
Bird (an electric scooter startup), cashed out part of his equity stake worth $44

385. Pollman, supra note 84, at 196–97.
386. Id. at 200.
387. Q&A with Nasdaq Private Market on Secondary Sales of Private Company Stock,
NASDAQ (Dec. 17, 2019, 9:25 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/qa-with-nasdaq-privatemarket-on-secondary-sales-of-private-company-stock-2019-12-17 [https://perma.cc/CR2DYGSD]; see also Pollman, supra note 84, at 197 (describing the change in SecondMarket’s
business model); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 560 (same).
388. See Pollman, supra note 84, at 200 (explaining how SharesPost acquired a registered
broker-dealer in response to an investigation by the SEC); see also Frequently Asked
Questions, FORGE GLOBAL, https://forgeglobal.com/faqs/?utm_term=sharespost_about/faqs
[https://perma.cc/9ZXM-VPHW] [hereinafter FORGE GLOBAL] (“Forge Markets is a fullservice broker dealer dedicated to the private growth equity asset class.”).
389. FORGE GLOBAL, supra note 388.
390. See Frequently Asked Questions, EQUITYZEN, https://equityzen.com/faq/
[https://perma.cc/8Y5K-B3K3] [hereinafter EQUITYZEN]; FORGE GLOBAL, supra note 378. In
2020, Forge announced plans to merge with SharesPost. See Connie Loizos, Once Rivals,
Secondary Market Player Forge Is Acquiring SharesPost in a $160 Million Cash-and-Stock
Deal, TECHCRUNCH (May 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/12/oncerivals-secondary-market-player-forge-is-acquiring-sharespost-in-a-160-million-cash-andstock-deal/ [https://perma.cc/Z6ZY-U4QV]. The announcement does not clarify which
business model the surviving company will pursue, but it is keeping the Forge brand. See id.
391. See Gilson, supra note 56, at 1083–84 (explaining that VCs create high-powered
incentives for managers by compensating them primarily in equity, which ensures that “the
overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation is dependent on the portfolio
company’s success”).
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million in a secondary transaction—even though the company was only a year old.392
Adam Neumann, the founder of WeWork, reportedly cashed out $500 million in
secondary transactions before the company imploded.393 A law firm partner based in
San Francisco told the Silicon Valley insider publication the Information that “[h]alf
of Series A and B deals now have some secondary component for founders.”394
Sometimes a board will have reasons to give non-manager shareholders liquidity.
Boards can strategically approve secondary sales for employees or outside investors
who get too noisy. A board may also decide to allow a broader set of employees to
sell, but only as part of a structured liquidity program that guarantees the incoming
investors are only making long bets. That is the selective liquidity business model
that EquityZen and Forge pioneered.
Even the minimal, selective liquidity that these secondary markets provide can be
valuable. Investors who believe the board will allow them to cash out on the
secondary markets if they desire will demand less of an illiquidity discount, which
reduces the cost of raising capital.395 The option for either founders or VCs to exit
their investments before an IPO can also improve startup governance by reducing
opportunism.396
But the secondary markets do not allow for the kind of robust trading that would
create a market for information about private companies. The private secondary
markets lack (1) volume, (2) liquidity, (3) price transparency, and (4) trader
anonymity. The presence of these features of public capital markets attracts short
sellers, analysts, and financial journalists. The absence of these features in the private
secondary markets prevents the kind of trading that could deter misconduct.
First, the secondary markets lack trading volume.397 The four main markets
executed over $4 billion worth of transactions in 2017.398 That number may sound
impressive, but it is multiple orders of magnitude lower than public capital markets.
The World Bank estimates that in the same year, the total value of stocks traded in
the United States was over $39 trillion.399 The low trading volume in secondary

392. See Amir Efrati & Alfred Lee, One Year in, Bird Founder Sells Some Shares, INFO.
(June 17, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/one-year-in-birdfounder-sells-some-shares [https://perma.cc/ZZJ8-ZD6A].
393. Berber Jin, Startup Founders Use Record-High Valuations to Cash Out Earlier, INFO.
(Sept. 13, 2021, 6:01 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/startup-founders-userecord-high-valuations-to-cash-out-earlier [https://perma.cc/L3H4-2SPJ].
394. Id.
395. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 23; Pollman, supra note 84, at 204.
396. Darian Ibrahim argues that VCs and entrepreneurs may behave less opportunistically
toward each other when both parties have a credible threat to exit in the secondary markets.
See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 24–27. He also argues that when VCs and managers disagree
about an acquisition or IPO, the secondary markets could mitigate the conflict by allowing one
party to exit while the other remains. See id. at 27–29.
397. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 557 (collecting news reports indicating little trading
activity on secondary markets).
398. Larcker, Tayan & Watts, supra note 381, at 3.
399. Stocks Traded, Total Value (Current US$) – United States, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD?locations=US
[https://perma.cc/D3UV-2YTT].
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markets makes prices less accurate.400 It also inhibits coverage by analysts and
financial journalists. Markets with fewer traders have fewer potential clients for
brokerage firms employing analysts and fewer potential subscribers to financial news
sites.
Second, the secondary markets are still highly illiquid compared to public
markets.401 In public markets, short sellers can reduce their exposure to risk by selling
shares just before revealing information and then repurchasing shares and reselling
them quickly after the price declines.402 In private secondary markets, traders cannot
always be assured that they can exit their position on demand. They often need to
wait for an acquisition or IPO.403 In the intervening time, the information about
misconduct that an investor had hoped to trade on may have been offset by other
news.
Third, secondary markets lack price transparency.404 This is partially due to the
structure of the markets—not all trades are reflected in a price on a centralized list—
and partially due to the complicated capital structure of venture-backed startups.
Inferring the price of a common share from the price of the most recently added class
of preferred shares is not straightforward because each class can carry different
contractual rights. The complexity of valuing startups creates opportunities for
manipulation. For example, at one point, EquityZen told prospective investors that
they could purchase shares of the unicorn Wish at “a 20.6% discount to the price paid
by recent investors.”405 EquityZen did not, however, acknowledge that the “recent
investors” purchased preferred shares or explain what rights the preferred shares had,
which renders the comparison misleading.406 The absence of a uniform market price
makes investors reluctant to trade, which in turn reduces trading volume and
liquidity.407
Fourth and finally, the secondary markets lack trader anonymity. Suppose that an
investor with legally acquired information about a unicorn’s misconduct wanted to
short its stock on a secondary market. If the company were public, the investor would
find any trader with a long position, borrow their shares, reveal the information, and

400. See Ken Nyholm, Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading, 25 J. FIN. RSCH.
485, 485–86 (2002) (finding, based on NYSE trading data, that “low volume stocks . . . are
slower to incorporate new information than are high-volume stocks”).
401. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 557–60.
402. See supra Section II.A.
403. For example, Forge tells investors that its investment vehicle will distribute “the
shares in each fund to investors once it determines that the shares become freely, practically,
and feasibly transferable for any reason”—and then lists as examples an acquisition or IPO.
FORGE GLOBAL, supra note 388. EquityZen tells investors to expect an investment horizon of
two to five years. EQUITYZEN, supra note 390.
404. See Letter from Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Professor of L., Duke Univ. Sch. of L., et
al.,
to
Vanessa
Countryman,
Secretary,
SEC
7
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193340-192501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UNR2-PFTD] (“[T]here is generally no single ‘market price’ at any given
time for private securities . . . .”).
405. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 70, at 122.
406. See id. at 123.
407. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1018–19 (1992).
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then repurchase the shares at a lower price. In a private company, shareholders are
unlikely to be interested in loaning their shares for short sales. Because most startup
shareholders are angels, VCs, founders, or employees, they are generally loyal to the
company. Indeed, many shares will be held by individuals with fiduciary obligations
to the company. Even if there were interested shareholders, the parties would need
the company’s approval before a secondary market transaction could take place. If
the company knew the investor was a potential whistleblower or connected to a
whistleblower, it would almost certainly refuse the sale.
For these reasons, as they are presently organized, private secondary markets
provide little deterrence to corporate misconduct.
D. Derivative Bets
In theory, investors could bet against a late-stage startup by investing in a
derivative. The most promising kind of derivative would be a synthetic swap. A swap
is an investment contract in which two parties, called counterparties, agree to
exchange payments over a fixed period.408 The value of the payments is derived from
the value of an underlying asset. In a synthetic swap, neither counterparty owns the
underlying asset.409 The synthetic swap contract is nothing more than a pure bet on
how the underlying asset’s value will change. Investors who wanted to bet on the
value of a startup could agree to a synthetic swap based on the value of its securities.
Suppose that an investor learned about unreported misconduct by Toast, a restaurant
payments systems unicorn. The investor could propose to a bank that they agree to a
synthetic swap contract in which they would pay each other periodic cash flows equal
to the change in value of a certain number of shares of Toast stock. If Toast’s value
declined, the bank would make a net payment to the investor. If it rose, the investor
would pay the bank. The synthetic swap would allow the investor to avoid the
regulatory and contractual limits on trading private company securities because no
actual Toast shares would change hands. It would also allow the investor to be
anonymous, which could be critical if the investor was a whistleblower or obtained
information from one.
However, some of the practical problems that bedevil the secondary markets
would also make a synthetic swap more costly. Because private secondary markets
lack transparent prices, it would be difficult to mark the value of the swap to shares
traded in those markets. The counterparties would need to rely on Toast’s publicly
reported valuations. Again, the complex capital structure of late-stage startups would
complicate the valuation.410 The counterparties would need to calculate the price of

408. Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1104, 1107 n.10 (2016) (“[A] swap is a series of mutual forward obligations whereby two
counterparties agree to periodically exchange cash flows over a specified period of time.”).
409. See id. at 1122 ( “[D]erivatives are often utilized in order to create synthetic exposures
to relatively illiquid assets . . . .”).
410. Basing a swap solely on the change in publicly reported valuations, without
accounting for the contractual rights for each new share class, would create the risk that the
cash flows exchanged would be distorted by a startup’s decision to give idiosyncratic terms to
its latest round of investors. That risk may not be random noise. There is evidence that startups
struggling to raise capital often give investors especially generous terms, which inflates their
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a common share by working backward from the latest valuation that Toast reported
and accounting for the special contractual rights in that round of shares.411 The
counterparties would face uncertainty about when Toast would raise funds and report
its next valuation.412
The bank would also face an adverse selection problem. It would struggle to find
information to independently assess the value of Toast stock. Because Toast is
private, the bank would not be able to evaluate its prospects by reviewing its
disclosures. Worse, the bank would know that its presumably better-informed
counterparty believed that Toast was overvalued. The bank could try to reduce the
information asymmetry by investigating the company, but the cost of the
investigation would have to be deducted from the net expected return of the swap.
The bank would also need to account for the investor’s credit risk.413 A long position
on equity would be costly for the bank’s capital requirements. For these reasons, it
is exceedingly unlikely a bank would agree to this kind of synthetic swap.
Even if a bank were interested, only very wealthy investors could propose the bet.
Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) ban the sale, purchase, or offer of any “security-based swap” by a
“person who is not an eligible contract participant” unless the security is
registered.414 Eligible contract participants include certain financial institutions and
individuals who have “amounts invested on a discretionary basis” in excess of $10
million.415 The SEC has demonstrated its willingness to enforce this provision. For
example, in 2016, the SEC settled charges against a company called Equidate for
trying to sell derivative contacts based on startup equity to persons who were not
eligible contract participants.416 After the settlement, Equidate switched its business
model and became the secondary market now known as Forge.417

reported valuations. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 70, at 142.
411. The counterparties could pull the most recently amended version of Toast’s certificate
of incorporation to determine the total number of authorized shares and estimate the number
of outstanding shares. They could then take the valuation that Toast reported after its most
recent fundraising round and divide it by the total number of shares outstanding. This would
yield the price of one share of the most recent class of preferred shares. The counterparties
would then need to scrutinize the certificate of incorporation to determine the special rights
that the new class of shares had, price those rights, and then calculate the value of shares
without the special rights.
412. The counterparties would also not know what contractual rights might be included in
the next round of preferred shares. When Toast announced a new round, the counterparties
would again have to pull the certificate of incorporation, assess the special rights of the new
class, and work backwards to derive the value of common shares.
413. See Awrey, supra note 408, at 1127 (emphasis in original) (explaining that the
duration of derivatives contracts “introduces the risk that a trader may become insolvent or
default . . . [which] in turn, makes the creditworthiness—and thus the identity—of the traders
highly relevant”).
414. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(e).
415. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(18)(A)(xi).
416. Press Release, SEC, Firm Settles Charges for Selling Unregistered Swaps Involving
Pre-IPO Companies (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-257.html
[https://perma.cc/NQ9M-LK7Z].
417. See Loizos, supra note 390 (noting that Forge used to be known as Equidate).
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In some situations, investors can indirectly bet against some private companies
by taking a long position in their public company competitors. For example, between
Carreyrou’s first article about Theranos in October 2015 and May 2016, the stocks
of the two leading publicly traded blood testing companies, LabCorp and Quest, rose
considerably.418 One analyst explained that “[i]t certainly hasn’t hurt their stock
prices that this hard-to-perfectly-handicap risk”—potential competition from
Theranos—“has become less of one.”419 Similarly, the stock of Medallion Financial,
a publicly traded company that lends to taxi medallion purchasers, lost value steadily
as Uber’s private valuations climbed in 2014 and 2015.420
But betting in favor of the competition is a highly risky strategy. Because the long
position cannot be hedged with a short position in the private company, the bet is
exposed to risks that would affect the industry as a whole. Late-stage startups often
lack clear public company competitors, especially if their business model is
unconventional. Public company competitors may also be more diversified, which
would make it hard to isolate the effect of reduced competition from a private
company. Whistleblowers should not expect that they can reliably profit from
revealing misconduct by betting on a synthetic swap or betting on the competition.
Even when they can, it is not clear that regulators or securities litigators will
understand the signal sent by their trading. Derivative bets would not allow for the
kind of robust trading that could deter unicorn misconduct.
IV. A MARKET FOR UNICORN SECURITIES
The best way to deter unicorn misconduct is to encourage trading of unicorn
securities. This Part proposes a three-pronged plan to build a market for more robust
trading of private company securities, without compromising investor protection.
First, reform section 12(g)’s record shareholder rule in order to liberalize trading
among accredited investors. Second, attach a regulatory MFN clause to private
company securities sold through certain SEC safe harbors, so that companies may
decide if their stock will be tradable but cannot selectively grant that right. Third,
require that all private companies that let their securities be traded make limited
public disclosures.
A. Secondary Market Liberalization
Part III explained how existing secondary markets for trading private company
securities do not allow the kind of robust trading that would deter misconduct. These
markets are highly illiquid and low volume. Prices are not transparent. Trading is not

418. Lewis Krauskopf, Lab Stocks Quest, LabCorp Shine as Testing Outlook Brightens,
https://reuters.com/article/questdiagnostics-laboratory-corp-stocks/lab-stocksREUTERS,
quest-labcorp-shine-as-testing-outlook-brightens-idUKL2N18K1T0 [https://perma.cc/ARS8PY4Y] (May 31, 2016, 7:01 AM).
419. Id.
420. See The ‘Uber Effect’ Is Crushing Taxi Medallion Prices and Spilling Over into
INSIGHTS:
RSCH.
BRIEFS
(Oct.
1,
2015),
Public
Markets,
CB
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/public-stock-driven-uber/
[https://perma.cc/B2H93JFE].
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anonymous. Consequently, short selling is impractical, and analysts and financial
journalists pay limited attention to private companies. The cause of these problems
is a combination of regulatory restrictions and contractual restraints. But these
regulations are designed to protect investors, and to some extent, they do.
A liberalized secondary market could allow robust trading—and protect
investors—by limiting access to accredited investors and simultaneously requiring
companies with securities being traded in the market to make basic public
disclosures. The conventional rationale for treating accredited investors differently
from retail investors is that they are more financially sophisticated than retail
investors.421 Critics have rightly pointed out that an investor’s wealth does not
reliably indicate sophistication, so the definition of accredited investor is both overand underinclusive.422 A trust fund kid might fit the definition, yet a finance professor
might not.423 The SEC could make the definition less underinclusive by allowing
sophisticated investors who are not wealthy to become certified by a test,424 but it is
harder to make the definition significantly less overinclusive without diminishing
trading volume.
A better defense of treating accredited investors differently is that they are better
able to absorb risk, because their investment portfolios are larger and more
diversified.425 The definition of accredited investor also has the advantage of being
objective and easy to implement.426 An accredited investor can demonstrate her
wealth simply by sending a bank statement to the market gatekeeper. The SEC could
stop the erosion of the wealth threshold by indexing it for inflation.427
Some scholars have argued that existing secondary markets for accredited
investors contribute to economic inequality by locking out investors of modest
means.428 Liberalizing secondary markets further could exacerbate the problem. But
in recent years, mutual funds have started to invest in unicorn securities.429 If mutual
funds invest in the liberalized secondary markets, they would enable less affluent
retail investors to invest in private company securities indirectly, without exposing
them to concentrated risk in any particular private company.
Limiting resales to accredited investors would also align the rules governing sales
and resales of private company securities. For example, Rule 506(b) allows private

421. See Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 667.
422. See Rodrigues, supra note 26, at 3422–25.
423. See id.
424. The SEC is considering that possibility. See Concept Release, supra note 30, at
30,473.
425. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 28, at 363.
426. See Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 666–67 (describing why the SEC and regulated parties
value objective rules).
427. The SEC is also considering that possibility. See Concept Release, supra note 30, at
30,478.
428. See Rodrigues, supra note 26, at 3415.
429. See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture
Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 47 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
675/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897254 [https://perma.cc/467M-S3GF]
(providing data showing the increase in mutual fund participation in unicorn fundraising
rounds).
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placements to only thirty-five unaccredited investors but to an unlimited number of
accredited investors.430 It would also follow the practice of existing secondary
markets, which are generally limited to accredited investors.431
Most importantly, robust trading is itself a form of investor protection. This point
is so obvious that it is often overlooked. Many investors never read a company’s
disclosures before they invest. Instead, they are protected by the actions of more
informed traders, who impound the information contained in public disclosures and
other sources, both public and private, into market prices.432 Private companies need
not be subjected to the more demanding disclosure requirements of public companies
for traders to gather information about them. All traders need is an incentive to look
and some basic information to get started. A more liquid, higher-volume, and
transparent market for trading private company securities would impound the
information that informed traders uncover into prices and protect less informed
investors.
The first step to liberalize trading among accredited investors is for Congress to
reform section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Recall that section 12(g) requires
companies to register their securities if they have $10 million in assets and a class of
securities “held of record” by 2000 shareholders or 500 shareholders who are not
accredited investors.433 If private companies allowed unrestricted trading of their
securities to accredited investors, they would quickly trigger the 2000 record
shareholder limit and be forced to go public prematurely. As long as the record
shareholder rule persists in its current form, companies will impose contractual
restraints on the alienation of their securities.
Eliminating the record shareholder rule as to accredited investors would obviate
the need for companies to restrict trading on markets limited to accredited investors.
Companies would still need to go public if they accumulated 500 unaccredited record
shareholders. In a sense, this reform would take the logic of the JOBS Act to its
logical conclusion: companies should only be forced to go public if their securities
are traded by many retail investors.434
Reforming section 12(g) would enable traders to make use of the recently enacted
section 4(a)(7) of the Exchange Act.435 That provision exempts from registration
resales of restricted securities among accredited investors, provided that certain

430. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2020).
431. See, e.g., EQUITYZEN, supra note 390 (“EquityZen offers private offerings, open to
accredited investors only.”); FORGE GLOBAL, supra note 390 (“Typically, to purchase
unregistered securities (i.e., private company stock), you must be . . . an ‘accredited
investor.’”).
432. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 572 (explaining that information uncovered
by professionally informed traders “is rapidly assimilated into price”).
433. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
434. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 28, at 365 (explaining that the JOBS Act’s
expansion of section 12(g)’s limit on the number of record shareholders who are accredited
investors “is a bow to the idea that such investors should protect themselves in terms of
information rights, but the number of shareholders is then capped at 1,999, so that the idea
cannot be taken to the extreme of an unlimited ‘sophisticated’ shareholder base that never
triggers 1934 Act registration”).
435. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(d).
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requirements are met.436 Today, most private companies are not keen to permit their
shares to be resold under section 4(a)(7) because (1) they worry about tripping
section 12(g)’s record shareholder rule and (2) they do not want to provide the
information—especially financial statements—that must be provided to
purchasers.437 Reforming section 12(g) would obviate the first concern. Mandating
that private companies make limited public disclosures would make the second
concern irrelevant.
Enabling accredited investors to use the section 4(a)(7) exemption would increase
the liquidity and trading volume of the secondary markets. Employee whistleblowers
who want to expose a company could liquidate their shares. Short sellers could
propose trades with existing shareholders. Companies would no longer need to
monitor their shareholders’ trades, provided that the shareholders traded over market
platforms restricted to accredited investors. The process of getting permissions or
legal opinions would end. If the market volume grew enough, analysts and financial
journalists would start to cover the traded companies and put their informationgathering networks to work.
It might be objected that liberalizing secondary markets will cause unicorns to
multiply faster. Some commentators concerned about the rise of unicorns have
sought to reverse the trend. For example, in 2019, a group of leading securities
regulation scholars wrote in a comment to the SEC that “Congress and the
Commission may need to take more aggressive action to usher firms into the public
markets.”438
It is true that liberalizing secondary markets will provide more private company
shareholders with liquidity. That will in turn reduce the illiquidity discount on their
shares, lower the cost of raising capital, and—on the margin—diminish the appeal
of going public. But the public capital markets have retail investors in addition to
accredited investors, so those markets will always be more liquid. Therefore,
companies will still have a financial incentive to go public to further reduce the
illiquidity discount. Most importantly, though, companies that remained private
could no longer evade the accountability that robust trading delivers.
B. Most Favored Nation Clause
Several scholars have called for liberalizing secondary trading in private company
securities.439 Some, but not all, of them would limit these newly liberalized markets
to accredited investors.440 These scholars advocate liberalization not because trading

436. See id.
437. See id. § 77d(d)(3).
438. de Fontenay et al., supra note 404, at 15. The scholars suggested “tightening the asset
size or shareholder threshold in Section 12(g)” or “making existing securities registration
exemptions available to an issuer only for a fixed time period.” Id.
439. See Pritchard, supra note 31, at 1019–21; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 580–92;
Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 661–72.
440. See Pritchard, supra note 31, at 1019–21 (proposing that securities on the private
market could only be sold to accredited investors); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 598 (rejecting
the idea that trading on the emerging firm market should be limited to accredited investors,
but suggesting that the market could be labeled “highly risky” and investors could be required
to “sign a form certifying that they understand the risks of participation”); Sjostrom, supra
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creates deterrence, but because greater liquidity reduces the cost of capital.441
Consequently, they would give companies discretion to decide whether, and on what
terms, they would allow their shareholders to participate in the secondary markets.442
It is unlikely, however, that most unicorns would voluntarily relinquish control
over their shares’ tradability just because they no longer needed to worry about
section 12(g)’s record shareholder rule. Unicorn managers would still want to avoid
the accountability of robust trading, just as Musk wanted to take Tesla private to
avoid short sellers.443 If private company managers strongly valued expanding
liquidity for their shareholders, they would be maximizing their shareholders’ access
to secondary markets under existing regulations. But instead, many companies
practice selective liquidity.444 They permit director and manager shareholders to cash
out in carefully controlled transactions. Directors and managers like selective
liquidity precisely because it allows them to limit their personal risk without facing
the scrutiny of trading.
Congress could force all companies to allow their securities to be traded by
banning the enforcement of all restraints on alienation. But that would effectively
end the possibility of concentrated ownership. Many companies prefer concentrated
ownership, and it is plausible that it can increase efficiency under certain
circumstances.445 For example, concentrated ownership might give an entrepreneur
more freedom to pursue her idiosyncratic vision.446 Managers with illiquid equity
stakes might consider longer time horizons in their decisions.447

note 31, at 668, 675–78 (proposing that securities on the sophisticated-investors-only market
could be sold only to accredited investors or investors who passed a “licensing exam created
and administered by the SEC”).
441. See Pritchard, supra note 31, at 1019 (suggesting that his proposal would “achieve
more efficient capital formation and better investor protection simultaneously”); Schwartz,
supra note 31, at 579 (explaining that his proposal would “offer both liquidity and investor
protection”); Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 662 (“The objective of this proposal is to carve a new
path to equity capital and share liquidity for private companies without compromising investor
protection.”).
442. See Pritchard, supra note 31, at 1020 (“The[] private markets would need the issuer’s
consent for the trading of their shares . . . .”); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 581 (expressing hope
that companies would find listing on the emerging firm market appealing); Sjostrom, supra
note 31, at 661–77 (proposing to create the sophisticated-investors-only market simply by
relaxing existing restrictions on the sale and resale of private securities).
443. See supra Section II.A.
444. See supra Section III.C.
445. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443 (2001) (“[B]oth concentrated and dispersed shareholdings have
been celebrated, at different times and by different commentators, for their ability to advance
shareholder interests in the face of serious agency problems.”).
446. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 577–83 (2016). There is some evidence that going public inhibits
innovation, though it is not clear how much of that effect is attributable to trading. See Shai
Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J. FIN. 1365, 1367 (2015) (finding that a
company’s innovation novelty, as measured by patent citations, declines after an IPO, but this
effect is counterbalanced by the company’s greater capacity to acquire innovative companies).
447. See Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 6–7 (summarizing the debate over whether “lock-in” is
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The better solution is a surgical ban on the practice of selective liquidity. The SEC
could attach a most favored nation clause to private company securities sold privately
through its regulatory safe harbors, like Rule 506(b) and Rule 701.448 An MFN clause
would provide that if the company granted any holder of any of the company’s
securities the right to sell, that right would automatically apply to all holders of the
company’s securities.
An MFN clause would come with an unanimity exception and a special rights
exception. The unanimity exception would provide that if all the company’s
shareholders consented to allow a particular resale, the transaction could proceed
without triggering the MFN clause for other securities. The special rights exception
would permit companies to require that any shareholders who held shares with rights
not granted to common shareholders—such as the rights found in the preferred shares
that VCs typically hold—convert their shares to common shares before selling
them.449 For example, if a VC’s preferred shares gave the VC the right to appoint a
director, the company would not be forced to allow the anonymous third party (to
whom the VC resold the shares) to appoint a director. The VC would have to convert
those preferred shares to common shares before reselling them.
An MFN clause would strongly encourage private companies to allow trading. If
directors and managers wanted the right to sell their own shares, they would have
two options: allow all their shareholders to sell or obtain the consent of all
shareholders each time they wanted to sell. For some directors and managers, their
personal desire for liquidity would lead them to support a company policy allowing
all shareholders to sell. If the directors and managers opted instead for the unanimity
route, other shareholders would at least have transparency into their sales. Outside
investors might ask why they should keep their capital in the company while one of
its leaders cashed out. Similarly, employee shareholders might have questions about
why they should continue to work for the company if their leadership’s revealed
preference indicated the company was a bad investment.450
The unanimity exception to the MFN clause would protect businesses that
preferred concentrated ownership, especially smaller businesses. The owners could
meet, discuss any shareholder’s proposed sale, and approve it. If any shareholder
objected, the company would be forced to disapprove the proposed sale, change the
company policy to let every shareholder sell, or agree by unanimous consent to let
the objecting shareholder sell as well. The unanimity exception would work well if
all owners were committed to concentrated ownership.

desirable). The empirical evidence on whether public company regulations promote short-term
thinking is mixed, and, again, it would be difficult to disentangle how much of any observed
effect is attributable to trading. See James J. Park, Do the Securities Laws Promote ShortTermism?, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 991, 1012–19 (2020).
448. The regulation may need to preempt state corporate law. See Macey & O’Hara, supra
note 382, at 607 (explaining that state corporate law regulates contractual restraints on
alienability).
449. See Smith, supra note 318, at 345–55 (discussing the special rights in a sample of
documents from 367 venture-backed startups).
450. Cf. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool's Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup,
11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 634–38 (2017) (expressing concern that employee shareholders’
and founders’ interests are misaligned in larger, late-stage startups).
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For most unicorns, though, obtaining the consent of every shareholder would be
difficult. The directors and managers would either need to agree that every
shareholder was locked in or adopt a permissive policy towards trading. The
combination of the MFN clause and the liberalization of secondary markets would
lead most unicorns to make their shares tradable. That in turn would create a market
for information about unicorn misconduct.
C. Limited Disclosure Mandate
Private companies that elect to allow their shares to be traded would also be
required to make certain limited public disclosures. Specifically, they would need to
disclose the information that private companies must make available for resales of
restricted securities under section 4(a)(7).451 That information includes, among other
things: “[a] statement of the nature of the business of the issuer and the products and
services it offers,” “[t]he names of the officers and directors of the issuer,” and “[t]he
issuer's most recent balance sheet and profit and loss statement and similar financial
statements.”452 The financial statements must cover the two “preceding fiscal years
as the issuer has been in operation” and “be prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles.453
The disclosure mandate would ensure that investors could identify the company
and understand its basic financial condition—a long-standing concern with existing
secondary markets.454 It would also enable investors to start their own research on
the company’s product, market, and personnel. But the burden of complying with
these disclosures would not be nearly as demanding as complying with Exchange
Act reporting regulations. For example, under the limited disclosure mandate,
companies would only need to provide financial statements annually, not quarterly.
The proposal reflects a similar thinking to the JOBS Act’s IPO On-Ramp.455
Private companies participating in the new secondary markets would face greater
disclosure obligations than private companies without tradable shares, but not as
demanding as those for public companies. Of course, companies would be permitted
to make more extensive disclosures, and investors in the secondary market might
reward them for it with higher share prices.
Some scholars have argued that all large private companies should be subject to
minimal disclosure requirements.456 Recent reporting suggests that the SEC may be

451. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (2020). For private companies, the current public
information requirement does not apply to resales by nonaffiliates. See id. § 230.144(b)(1)(ii).
452. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(d)(3)(G)-(H), (J).
453. Id. § 77d(d)(3)(J)(i)-(ii).
454. Pollman, supra note 84, at 207–11 (explaining how little information noninsider
secondary market investors can find about private companies).
455. See supra Section I.A.
456. See Fan, supra note 23, at 609 (proposing that the mandate would apply to unicorns);
Guttentag, supra note 36, at 208–11 (proposing that the mandate would apply to companies
with over $35 million in market capitalization and over 100 beneficial owners unless they
restrict the tradability of their shares or comply with an alternative disclosure regime); Lipton,
supra note 36, at 563 (proposing that the mandate would vary based “on size, taking into
account gross receipts, number of employees, asset values, or some combination of the three”
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listening to them.457 The conventional rationale for mandating disclosures is investor
protection. These scholars argue, however, that a company’s disclosures also provide
useful information to noninvestor stakeholders—competitors, suppliers, workers,
and the communities in which it operates.458 The rise of unicorns—large, socially
significant private companies—has strengthened that argument.459
Mandating limited disclosures for private companies that allow trading would go
part of the way to these scholars’ goal of universal disclosure by large private
companies. Liberalized secondary markets and a regulatory MFN clause would
likely push most large private companies to allow trading and accept the limited
disclosure mandate. Companies that elected not to allow trading would likely be
smaller businesses.
Disclosures alone would deter some kinds of misconduct, especially self-dealing.
Consider the SoftBank-backed unicorn The We Company, better known as WeWork.
WeWork paid founder Adam Neumann approximately $5.9 million in stock for the
trademark to its distinctive use of the pronoun “We.”460 When WeWork filed the
registration statement for its later-aborted IPO, it was required to disclose the
transaction.461 Once the deal was revealed, WeWork was widely criticized in the
press, and Neumann reluctantly agreed to return the shares.462 As Felix Frankfurter
once wrote, “There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening.”463
It is hard to feel too much sympathy for SoftBank or WeWork’s VC investors,
who were undoubtedly aware of the transaction and should have realized that it was
inappropriate. But disclosure would also have protected WeWork’s rank-and-file

(footnote omitted)).
457. See Kiernan, supra note 37.
458. See Lipton, supra note 36, at 511–19 (describing the value of disclosure for
noninvestor audiences). Some of Lipton’s arguments relate to misconduct. See, e.g., id. at 517
(arguing that disclosures would help regulators trying to determine if a company in their
jurisdiction is compliant). Others address broader distributional concerns. See, e.g., id. at 511–
12 (arguing that disclosures would help employees or consumers who can use knowledge of a
company’s margin to drive a harder bargain).
459. See Jones, supra note 36, at 179 (“Because Unicorns are free from public disclosure
requirements, they can engage in questionable activities with less fear of exposure . . . .”);
Lipton, supra note 36, at 522–23 (emphasis in original) (“[T]he secrecy afforded by private
status, coupled with the sizes to which [late-stage startups] can grow, makes problems more
likely to develop and less likely to be addressed, which magnifies the harms they can cause.”).
460. See Eric Platt, WeWork’s Adam Neumann Returns Controversial $5.9m Payment, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d6cb7a44-cf07-11e9-b018-ca4456540ea6
[https://perma.cc/BU2M-UT9Q].
461. The We Co., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 199 (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533523/000119312519220499/d781982ds1.htm#
toc781982_10 [https://perma.cc/N46W-8XB2] (“[T]he Company issued to WE Holdings LLC
partnership interests in the We Company Partnership with a fair market value of approximately
$5.9 million . . . .”); id. at 192 (stating that Adam Neumann “serves as a managing member”
of WE Holdings LLC).
462. See Platt, supra note 460.
463. Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 55.
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employee shareholders, who might not have been aware of the deal.464 To be sure,
WeWork had to disclose the deal as a related-party transaction.465 But even if it had
been required only to release a balance sheet, it would have been hard to hide the
$5.9 million expense.
Greater disclosure might also deter other kinds of misconduct, especially by
shining light on how startups use financial metrics that do not comply with GAAP.466
Ackman’s analysis of Herbalife’s financial statements is what showed that Herbalife
was making money from its distributors, not from selling its product.467 Wells
Fargo’s seemingly impressive cross-selling numbers were inextricably linked to its
practice of opening accounts without its customers’ consent.468 Disclosure
requirements that reveal accounting fraud can illuminate other misconduct.
But disclosures alone will not always deter misconduct.469 Disclosures combined
with trading deter misconduct. Disclosures alone would not create opportunities for
short sellers. Disclosures would likely not attract the scrutiny of many analysts or
financial journalists, who have the skills to catch the subtle analytical sleights of hand
in financial statements. The opportunity to profit from trading Wirecard’s stock
created the professional incentives to dig into Wirecard’s complex transactions in
Asia.470 The absence of short sellers, analysts, and financial journalists in a
disclosure-only system would also make it harder for employee whistleblowers—
who have the information to prove that financial statements are false—to amplify
their message. Secrist would not have gotten the word out as quickly without Dirks.
CONCLUSION
Securities regulation reflects the philosophy that sophisticated investors should
fend for themselves. If unicorn misconduct only affected VCs or other sophisticated
investors, the appropriate reaction might be to tell those investors: caveat emptor.
But the misconduct at Theranos, Uber, and Juul harmed third parties irreversibly.
Neither tort liability nor substantive regulation provided adequate deterrence. If those
companies’ securities had been widely traded, information about misconduct would
likely have been revealed earlier, and some of the harm would have been avoided.
Hundreds of millions of dollars of scarce capital would not have been allocated to
fraudulent companies or illicit markets.
There is a large and growing group of companies that may not yet be ready for
the discipline of quarterly earnings calls but have the power to commit misconduct
at scale. The securities laws do not have a regulatory category that fits them.

464. See Cable, supra note 436, at 635–39 (offering reasons to doubt that employee
shareholders’ interests are adequately protected in late-stage startups).
465. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2020).
466. See Demos, Ovide & Pulliam, supra note 275 and accompanying text.
467. See supra Section II.A.
468. See supra Section II.B and accompanying notes.
469. Private companies would, however, be exposed to liability for these disclosures. The
workhorses of securities fraud litigation, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5,
apply to private company securities. See Winship, supra note 311, at 680–81.
470. In fact, one of the first analysts to expose Wirecard specialized in advising short
sellers. See Alderman & Schuetze, supra note 257.
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Regulation should adapt now that unicorns are multiplying, and we know they are
not all harmless. Unicorns should not be killed, but they should be tamed.
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